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This paper summarises recent research on changes in New Zealand’s income distribution.  It 
describes how the income distribution has changed during the period 1981 to 1996.  It then 
looks at factors accounting for these changes in the income distribution.  The main focus is 
on social trends, such as household composition, and changes in individual characteristics, 
such as age, qualifications and employment status. 
 
The first part of the paper looks at trends in the income distribution.  This shows that income 
inequality rose in the 1980s and 1990s in New Zealand.  The rate of growth was fastest in 
the 1980s.  New Zealand’s level of income inequality has risen substantially relative to the 
levels in other OECD countries. 
 
Wellbeing measured in income terms depends not just on income at a given point in time, but 
also on the extent to which that income position persists through time.  The second major 
part of this paper focuses on recent research on income ‘dynamics’.  Analyses using tax data 
show that incomes do vary considerably from period to period.  However, there is also a 
considerable degree of income ‘persistence’.   
 
The final part of the paper looks at factors contributing to the increase in income inequality.  
Changes in household composition, (such as the growth in sole parent households and older 
households without children), account for some of the increase in household income 
inequality.  A growing proportion of workers in their prime earning years, and with higher 
educational qualifications, has also increased income inequality.  These factors can explain 
up to 50-60% of the overall increase in income inequality.   
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Purpose of discussion paper 
 
1.  This working paper describes how income inequality has changed during the 
period 1981 to 1996.  It then looks at factors accounting for these changes in 
inequality.  The main focus is on social trends such as household composition, 
and changes in individual characteristics such as age, qualifications and 
employment status.  
 
2.  The paper does not provide an exhaustive literature survey of all aspects of 
income inequality.  It focuses on broad trends for individuals and households 
and gives some attention to the varying experience of different groups in 
society.  Although it does not look in detail at such important issues as the 
experience of Mäori, and regional dimensions of inequality, it does provide a 
reference point for ongoing inquiries into aspects of New Zealand’s income 
distribution.   
 
Summary of changes in New Zealand’s income distribution 
 
3.  Income inequality rose in the 1980s and the 1990s in New Zealand. This 
conclusion is reached regardless of how income is measured: individual or 
household incomes, before or after tax, from different data sources, and after 
adjusting for changes in household size and composition. 
 
Timing of the changes 
 
4.  Income inequality rose most substantially in the late 1980s, but continued to 
increase more slowly during the 1990s.   
 
5.  Income inequality did not fall during the economic expansion in the 1990s.   
This provides some evidence that it was driven by structural changes to the 
fabric of the economy or society, not just by the business cycle. 
 
How do we compare internationally? 
 
6.  Income inequality also increased in Australia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States over the last two decades. The increase in New Zealand’s income 
inequality seems, however, to have been proportionately larger than that seen in 
most other developed economies.  New Zealand now appears to have one of the 
highest levels of inequality in the OECD.  These international comparisons are 
difficult because of differences in data sources and measurement methods 
between countries.  However, it can be said with confidence that New Zealand’s 
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Changes in the shape of the distribution  
 
7.  Charts of the income distribution show that the proportion of middle-income 
households has fallen, and the proportion in the low income and top income 
bands has increased.  The reduced share of middle-income households makes 





Trends in real incomes 
 
8.  The average incomes of those in the top tenth of households have risen 
significantly in real terms between 1982 and 1996. Average real incomes of 
those in the lower and middle-income groups fell.  
 
9.  There was a significant reduction in the real incomes of those in the bottom ten 
percent of households, by about 5 percent on average.  Nonetheless, the decline 
seems to have been less than for those groups further up the distribution.   
Certain household types – particularly sole parent families - make up a larger 
proportion of the ‘lowest income’ group than formerly; whereas the elderly have 
on the whole improved their position. 
 
                                                 
1   The horizontal axis of the graph measures incomes on a logarithmic scale. This expands the lower 
and middle parts of the income distribution, making it visually easier to discern changes in these 
parts of the distribution.  It also, however, visually compresses changes at the top end of the 
distribution. The ‘kernel density’ is a technical method for  showing the proportion of households at 
each (log) income level.  It is calculated by allocating the sample households, ranked from poorest 
to richest, into 250 ‘bins’, each with an equal number of households. The resulting bar-chart is then 
smoothed. If the sample were uniformly distributed over the income range, there would be 1/250th 
(0.4 %) of the sample at each point. Looking at the peak of the 1983-86 graph, we see for instance 
that  around 0.64 percent (about two thirds of one percent) of households had incomes around 
$55,000.  In 1995-98, only about 0.47 percent of households had incomes around $55,000.  
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10.  The mid 1980s represent an historical break in real income growth, especially 
for men. Up until the 1980s, a person at a given age could expect to earn on 
average a higher real income than a person older than him or her had earned at 
the same age. This ceased to hold, for men in particular, from 1981, because of 
a substantial fall in labour force participation by males, which has yet to be fully 
recovered.  
 
11.  Slow income growth continues to be a key factor in welfare outcomes.  Mean 
household after-tax incomes grew by 0.4% per year over the 1986 – 1996 
period, or 0.7% per annum if adjustment is made for falling average household 
size.  However, median household incomes after tax declined over this period, 




12.  Some people who were ‘high’ income in one period, may move to lower income 
groups in a subsequent period, and vice versa.  These income dynamics are 
important for studying the welfare consequences of income inequality.  Income 
differences have greater welfare implications when they persist over time.   
 
13.  There have been recent studies of short-term income mobility in New Zealand 
using IRD tax data for individuals. This evidence shows that there exists 
substantial period-to-period income volatility. However, income differences 
also show significant persistence over time.  At the end of a few years, around 
half of the population will remain in the income group they started in, and 
around half will have moved. 
 
14.  There is less information about income mobility over a longer time-frame.  It 
would be useful to have more information on links between background 
characteristics (such as family background, schooling), the development of 
skills and people’s level of wellbeing over time.  There is a paucity of 
information with which to answer these questions, given the lack of large-scale 
surveys that follow people over a long period.  Yet, these issues are central to 




15.  Analysis of data from the Christchurch Health and Development Study (CHDS) 
shows that most families in the study over a 14-year period did not experience 
poverty, or did so only ‘transiently’. Poverty was defined as family income of 
less than 60% of the median income of those in the survey.  Under this 
definition, two-thirds (67%) of the children in the study over a 14-year period 
were in families that did not experience poverty, or did so for at most one year 
in the fourteen.  Only 2 percent experienced chronic poverty (spells never 
separated by more than one year) or poverty for the whole 14 years, but this 
group accounted for 13 percent of all those in poverty at a given point in time.  
The percentages vary for different poverty line assumptions.  Overseas panel 
surveys show a similar picture. 
   12 
16.  An important policy issue is whether ‘poverty persistence’ tends to be worsened 
as a result of receiving a social welfare benefit (for example, due to the 
stigmatising effects of benefit receipt). Investigation of longitudinal incomes 
data for benefit recipients, using tax sources, suggests that the answer may be 
no. It may be individual characteristics (such as skill levels) which make them 
more likely to be a benefit recipient.  The receipt of a benefit in itself does not 
appear to have an independent effect on someone’s ability to get off the benefit 
system.  However, further work should test this result against evidence drawn 
from benefit system statistics and qualitative research. 
 
Contributors to the change in cross-sectional income inequality 
 
17.  A number of investigators have tried to identify the precise reasons for the 
increase in inequality since the early to mid 1980s. They have used different 
techniques and data sets, and do not reach identical conclusions, but there are 
some common elements.  
 
Changes to individual income inequality 
 
18.  Analyses from Census data show about 60 percent of the increase in income 
inequality among the employed over the period 1986 to 1996 to be accounted 
for by shifts in labour force composition and by widening income differentials 
by occupation, education, industry and age. 
 
19.  An analysis of the increase in wage and salary inequality between 1984 and 
1997, measured in terms of HES data on weekly full-time earnings, found just 
under 30% to be accounted for by changes in workers’ formal qualifications and 
age (as a proxy for potential experience), and in returns to those attributes. 
 
20.  The increases in weekly earnings dispersion were substantially larger than the 
increases in hourly earnings dispersion. The increase in inequality of weekly 
earnings is partly accounted for by an increase in average hours worked by 
those in full-time employment, with the increase being greater for those with 
higher earnings.   
 
Changes to ‘couple’ incomes 
 
21.  Changes in the relative proportion of ‘no income’, ‘one income’, and ‘double 
income’ couple households explain a part of the increase in income inequality in 
the late 1980s. 
 
Changes in household income inequality 
 
22.  A Department of Labour/Treasury research programme is investigating the 
contributors to changes in household income inequality.  This work is still in 
progress. However, preliminary findings show that 10-25% of the increase in 
inequality is associated with changes in household composition (such as the 
growth of sole parent households and older households without children).  A 
further 25% is associated with changes in the age-mix, employment status and   13 
qualifications of the population.  For example, a growing proportion of workers 
in their prime earning years tended to increase income inequality.  Similarly, a 
growing proportion of the workforce with higher educational qualifications also 
increased income inequality.  
 
23.  Surprisingly, job losses during the 1980s had little effect on most overall 
measures of income inequality.  Employment losses were experienced across 
the whole of the distribution.  They had the effect of compressing the bottom 
half of the distribution and, by dragging down the median, increasing inequality 
in the top half of the distribution.  These two effects largely offset each other, 
thus having little effect on the overall measure of inequality. 
 
24.  The remaining proportion (around 50 percent) is still unexplained. It could be 
due to factors such as shifts in industry specific unemployment rates during the 
1980s, or increased dispersion of earnings within groups with the same 
educational qualifications and other factors. 
 
25.  An independent study using Census data generated similar results. This study 
also found that household composition accounted for a significant proportion of 
the change in inequality (around 20 per cent).  However, this study attributed a 
greater share to changes in the employment status of families.  The two studies 
employ quite different methodologies, so their findings are not directly 
comparable.   
 
26.  While household composition and other demographic factors appear to account 
for some of the increase, more fundamental drivers may lie behind these trends.  
For example, the stress of economic restructuring probably contributed to the 
acceleration in family dissolution during the 1980s.  However, it is difficult to 
disentangle the effect of government policy from systemic social change. 
 
Sources of income, taxes and welfare transfers 
 
27.  Another approach looks at ‘sources of income’, for example the shares of self-
employment, wages and salary or capital income and the effect of taxes and 
welfare transfers.   
 
28.  The overall impact of the 1980s tax reforms has not been fully assessed.  Work 
to date shows a strong contribution to increasing inequality arising from 
changes in the direct/indirect tax mix in the 1980s.  On the other hand removing 
tax loopholes and significant increases in company tax rates may have partially 
off-set this effect.  Furthermore, the behavioural changes have not been assessed 
(such as the extent to which people changed their level of work effort in 
response to the tax changes). 
 
29.  In the latest period, 1990/91 to 1995/96, direct tax changes appear to have made 
a contribution to reducing income inequality.  However, this finding may simply 
reflect an increase in the share of total income earned in higher tax brackets.  
The analysis summarised in this paper does not include effects of changes to   14 
independent family tax credit and family support since 1996, nor other recent 
tax changes. 
 
30.  Benefits tended to reduce income inequality in the late 1980s, with more people 
relying on benefits as a source of income during the recession.  They made only 
a small contribution to increased inequality in the 1991-96 period. 
 
31.  The inequality of income from both self-employment and wages and salary 
sources increased.  In fact, this increase in inequality of labour market incomes 
accounted for a bigger part of the overall increase in inequality. Labour market 
income inequality increased further in the 1990s. 
 
Conclusion and policy implications 
 
32.  Inequality has increased in New Zealand over the past two decades.  The 
number of middle-income families has reduced, some moving further down the 
distribution, and others moving up.  There have been winners and losers, but the 
overall picture (combined with only modest increases in average incomes over 
the period) should be a source of concern for policy makers.   
 
33.  Allowing more people to share in real income growth will require policies to 
raise national income per person, alongside policies to redistribute income 
growth. 
 
34.  A number of potentially competing objectives are subsumed within a broad 
‘distributional’ heading.  Policies could aim to address: 
 
·  situations of unacceptable hardship; 
 
·  issues relating to the spread of incomes across individuals and families, 
and across different ethnic groups, and regions; and 
 
·  issues concerning fairness across different generations. 
 
35.  The choice of objectives will depend on political judgements about such things 
as societal views on fairness and equality of opportunity, and consideration of 
implications for other government objectives. 
  
36.  Whatever objectives are chosen, it is important to identify which policy 
approaches are likely to be most effective.  A starting question is: which of the 
factors causing rising inequality are within the government’s control?  This 
paper is a contribution to well-informed debate on this important question.   
 
37.  Further work might look more closely at different aspects of income inequality, 
and factors affecting particular groups in society.  Potential candidates for 
further work include: 
 
·  looking more closely at groups of less skilled individuals and policies that 
will be effective in raising the income earning opportunities of these 
groups;   15 
 
·  reviewing the impact of government policy on the welfareRI0RULDQG
achieving a better understanding of factors influencing the position of 
0RULLQ1HZ=HDODQGVRFLHW\  
 
·  exploring the implications of income dynamics for policy.  This might 
involve looking more closely at the welfare implications of people moving 
frequently between the benefit system and low paid work;    
 
·  investigating the regional dimension of income inequality and reviewing 
which policies will be most effective in addressing regional income 
disparities; and 
 
·  looking at the effect of government policy on intergenerational 
redistribution (for example, the effect of superannuation policy on the 
distribution of income between generations). 
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1.  The purposes of this paper are – 
 
-  to describe the changes in New Zealand’s income distribution in recent 
years; 
 
-  to set out what is known about the causes of these changes; 
 
-  to discuss possible policy implications. 
 
2.  To do this the paper summarises the relevant New Zealand research. It also 
draws on overseas research where helpful. 
 
The relationship between income and wellbeing 
3.  The reason for studying the income distribution, and changes in the distribution, 
is that income has a vital role in determining the ‘wellbeing’ of individuals and 
of families. We are interested in –  
 
(a)  absolute levels of income, for the population in general, and for specific 
population sub-groups, and how they are changing over time, and what 
this implies for the  ‘standard of living’ of various groups within the 
community; 
 
(b)  relative incomes, and changes in the relativities, and to what extent such 
changes can, or should, be seen as ‘equitable’ or ‘fair’. 
 
4.    Whether or not a given outcome in terms of income inequality is seen as 
desirable is decided by the value judgements of the community, and of the 
government of the day. There is probably a wider range of opinion in discussing 
the distribution of income about what is  ‘fair’ and what is ‘unfair’ than in any 
other part of economic life.  This paper tries not to make judgements about 
‘fairness’. Its purpose is to supply information which will make such 
judgements better informed. 
 
5.   It should be remembered that income is not necessarily the ideal measure of 
wellbeing.  Clearly, an individual’s sense of wellbeing is influenced by a range 
of non-monetary factors including social interactions, the quality of the 
environment, job satisfaction and so forth.  Even in the narrower case of 
pecuniary welfare, income may not always be the best guide.  For instance the 
welfare of retired people may vary widely depending on the private savings 
available to them, even when their current incomes are very similar. Young 
people may prefer a lower income now in the expectation of a higher future 
income, and may borrow money to finance their current standard of living, and 
pay this off from higher income in the future.  This suggests that expenditure 
patterns may sometimes be a better guide to welfare than current income.   
   18 
6.   Ideals are rarely totally achievable in practice, and that is the case here.  Most of 
the available data-sets provide information on incomes, and hence most of the 
material summarised here concerns the distribution of income.  However, 
expenditure studies are used to provide a useful cross check on the income 
based picture when available. 
 
Unit of analysis: individual, family or household? 
 
7.  We may get different pictures of wellbeing depending on whether we study 
individual or family income distribution.  Income is most commonly received 
by individuals from their activities in the market-place. The incomes of families 
are predominantly the sum of individual incomes, so it is important to 
understand the distribution of individuals’ incomes in order to understand the 
distribution of family incomes. Individuals may have access to income provided 
by other family members, most commonly but not exclusively when sharing the 
same house (Fleming, 1997, reports on studies of income sharing in New 
Zealand families).  The type of social changes experienced in New Zealand and 
other Western countries over the last few decades means that the traditional 
focus of analysis, the ‘nuclear family’ – a parent or parents plus children - is 
becoming a less typical social grouping.  Many individuals will be part of 
extended families, perhaps be a member of a ‘blended’ family, and perhaps 
share living space with unrelated individuals, for example people flatting 
together. This means that it is important to monitor distributional changes from 
the perspective of individuals and also of other social groupings.  
 
8.  This report summarises material on individual income distribution and 
household or family income.  One specific aim of this paper is to provide some 
evidence on how families in general, and specific kinds of family, have fared in 
the changing social environment. In particular, is the proportion of families 
‘under pressure’ for income reasons increasing? How many are just temporarily 
‘under pressure’, and how many are permanently or regularly so? Some 
research results relating to these questions are given later in the paper.  
 
9.   Unfortunately, analysis is limited by the way statistics tend to be collected with 
reference to a ‘household’ and it is extremely difficult to explore the range of 
social units now existing in society, or to analyse the traditional family unit 
itself.  Different family members may live in separate households (for instance 
when student children go flatting).  The ‘household’ analysis may therefore 
miss important linkages between individuals (for instance, child support paid to 
the custodial parent in the case of separation).  On the other hand, a household 
analysis may assume transfers within the household that do not take place (for 
instance where a principal earner’s income is not shared equitably between all 
household members).   




10.   The best measure of welfare will provide information on how people’s level of 
wellbeing changes over time.  This is known as a dynamic picture of welfare.  
For instance, we want to know which groups are more likely to experience long 
periods of low income, and which groups may experience a temporary income 
shock but recover at a later period.  The typical measure of income distribution 
does not provide this level of information because it takes a snap-shot of a 
particular time period.  Thus similar degrees of income inequality at this point 
in time may generate quite different welfare implications, depending on whether 
the underlying distribution is linked to persistent or transitory income 
inequality.  This has important implications for policy.  In particular, people 
experiencing persistent low income are less likely to be able to ride out these 
periods without government assistance.  It may also have implications for the 
level of assistance required, given the erosion of private resources it entails and 
the likely linkages with other deprivation measures such as health outcomes. 
 
11.    Given the importance of a dynamic picture, this paper pulls together those 
studies that analyse income trends from this perspective.  Unfortunately, much 
of this analysis is limited by the absence of a large longitudinal panel survey in 
New Zealand.  Some recent unpublished Treasury research using tax data is 
explored, along with a special study of family incomes in Christchurch over a 
14 year period.  These findings are discussed in part B. 
 
Scope of report 
 
12.  To contain this report to a reasonable length some matters have been left outside 
its scope. They include – 
 
(a)  The definition and measurement of ‘poverty’. There has been good work 
in recent years using community focus groups to help determine ‘poverty 
lines’, (Stephens et. al., 1995; Waldegrave et. al., 1996) It is clear, 
however, that it is not easy to define measures which will give results 
across time and for communities across the whole country which will be 
accepted by all (Easton, 1997. Stephens, et. al., 1997).  
 
(b)  ‘Non-cash’ transactions, and also government provided services. The 
analyses discussed in this report are of ‘cash’ incomes, for which 
information is more readily available. A fuller picture would be obtained 
from including also ‘non-cash’ income; e.g. fringe benefits, capital gains 
in many instances; and from including the value of free or subsidised 
government services, particularly education and health. The last study to 
include the second of these items was the Fiscal Impact study by Statistics 
NZ, published in 1990. 
 
(c)  Regional income distribution.  Martin (1999) found regional differentials 
to be increasing; but otherwise there has been little investigation of this 
topic. 
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(d)  ‘Social outcomes’ of income differentials. In particular health outcomes 
are well-known to be associated with income, as part of a general 
association of poor health with low socio-economic status. There is also at 
least a suggestion in much recent international work that an increase in 
community income inequality has an adverse effect on the health of 
members of that community (Crampton and Howden-Chapman, 1997; 
Howden-Chapman et al., 2000); although this conclusion is still very 
much disputed.  
 
13.   There are a number of concepts and definitions used in the remainder of this 
paper which are described in more detail in Appendix A. The more important 
points are – 
 
·  The three most commonly used income concepts are Market income 
(income from salaries and wages, self-employment, interest, rent, 
dividends, private pensions, etc.); Gross or pre-tax income, which 
includes benefits and other transfers as well as Market income; and 
Disposable income, that is income after tax and tax credits. 
 
·  All these exclude ‘non-cash’ transactions, and also the benefit of goods 
and services provided free or subsidised by the government. 
 
·  The measurement of the ‘standard of living’ of a given family or 
household needs to take account of the number of persons drawing on the 
family or household’s income, and also of the different needs of different 
household members, for example children as against adults. One way of 
doing this is by adjusting a household’s income by an Equivalence scale 
to calculate its Equivalent income, allowing for the effect of household 
size and composition on the household’s needs.  
 
·  Incomes at different periods are adjusted to the same real value by 
deflating by the Consumers Price Index in the case of Disposable income, 
and by the Reserve Bank price index excluding GST, for Market and 
Gross income (to allow for the effect of GST in 1986-1989, and the 
offsetting reduction in direct taxes).  
 
·  The standard time-period for most analyses in this report is the year. 
 
·  A number of measures of income inequality are used, including the 
standard deviation, the Gini coefficient, the Inter-Quartile difference, the 
Mean Logarithmic Deviation, and decile ratios. More detail is given in the 
appendix, particularly on the Gini coefficient, which is the most used 
measure in this report. All these increase in value with increasing income 
inequality.  
 
·  Most New Zealand income distribution measures are based on the 
Household Economic Survey (HES), and are therefore subject to sampling 
error.    21 
 
Structure of report 
 
14.    Part A describes the changes which have occurred to the distribution of 
household income in recent years, generally since the early 1980s, and 
summarises evidence from a number of sources showing that income inequality 
has increased, and increased significantly. 
 
15.   Part B gives examples of what the changes have meant for particular groups in 
society. This is first done in ‘static’ terms; that is examining the changes over 
time in  ‘cross-sectional’ measures of the income distribution made at given 
points in time. Then some information is given on income ‘dynamics’, trying to 
trace the income paths of individuals or of groups of individuals or households 
through time. This includes some results for low income families. 
 
16.   Part C summarises the results of a number of researchers trying to explain why 
income inequality has increased.     
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Part A:  Description Of The Changes 
 
A.1  The shape of the current distribution 
 
1.   Income is unequally distributed. Some persons, or households, receive much 
more in a given period than others. 
 
2.  Chart 1 illustrates this. It shows the distribution of Gross, or pre-tax, household 
income for 1995/96. The chart is based on data from Statistics New Zealand’s 
Household Economic Survey (HES) – the main New Zealand source of data for 
income distribution studies. 
 
 
3.  ‘Gross’ income includes regular or recurring income from all sources. In 
particular it includes social welfare and NZ Superannuation benefits, and family 
tax credits, as well as all ‘market’ income (wages and salaries, self-employment 
income, and investment income) received by the household. It excludes income 
of an ‘irregular’ nature, for instance winnings from gambling, gifts, and 
bequests. The different ways of measuring income are discussed in Appendix A. 
 
4.  The shape of the distribution in Chart 1 is that typically seen for income 
distributions. There are a small number of households with low incomes, of less 
than $10,000 a year (there is also a cluster, not shown, of households reporting 
zero or negative incomes, amounting to less than 0.2 percent of all households, 
most of these probably being ‘self-employed’ households, including farming 
families). Most households are grouped in the ‘mid-range’, from about $12,000 
up to around $50,000 per year. Beyond that, to the right, there is a long ‘tail’ of 
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5.  Chart 1 is not the best way of giving a visual impression of the income 
distribution. Too much of the detail is crammed in to the left-hand part of the 
chart. Chart 2, from a recent Treasury seminar presentation by Hyslop and Maré 
(Sept.1999), also plots the distribution of Gross Household Income, but on a 
logarithmic scale, and averaged over the three years 1995/96 to 1997/98. (The 
‘kernel density’ on the vertical axis is a measure of relative numbers
2.) The 
logarithmic scale expands the left part of the distribution relative to the right 
part. The main part of the distribution is in the $30,000 to $80,000 range, but 
there are also two ‘peaks’ in the distribution at lower income points, around 
$14,000 and $20-22,000. These are mainly ‘pensioner’ households. An 
advantage of plotting income distributions using a logarithmic scale is that it 
makes easier comparisons of relative changes. For example, suppose everyone’s 
income increases 10 percent to match a 10 percent increase in consumer prices, 
so that no one is better or worse off.  On a logarithmic scale the income 
distribution simply shifts rightward by the same amount for everyone. Whereas 
on a standard scale, those on higher income move rightward by a greater 
amount than those on lower incomes, apparently improving their position when 
in fact they have not. 
 
                                                 
2 For more detail, see Footnote 1 to the chart in the Executive Summary. 
 
Chart 2:   Distribution of Household Gross Incomes on logarithmic scale. 
 HES 1995/96-1997/98 aggregated 
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A.2  The recent changes in the income distribution 
 
6.  Chart 3 (again from Hyslop and Maré, 1999) includes, in addition to the 
information given in Chart 2, the corresponding distribution of gross household 
income for the period 1983-86 twelve to fifteen years earlier. The intervening 
period was one in which the New Zealand economy underwent dramatic 
changes. 
 
7.  It is very apparent visually that the distribution became ‘flatter’ and more 
unequal over this period. The proportion of households in the $30,000 to 
$100,000 range fell significantly. The proportions in both lower and higher 
income groups increased. Standard statistical measures of income inequality 
show sizeable increases. 
 
8.  These results are borne out by other work publicised recently (Podder and 
Chatterjee – 1998; and Statistics NZ – 1999. Their key results are discussed 
further below.) Indeed the aim of Hyslop and Maré’s work was to pin down 
more exactly the causes of the changes documented in the two earlier reports. 
 
9.  This increase in inequality in the last decade or so has also been observed in a 
number of other developed economies, though not all. Chart 4 draws on the 
Statistics NZ report (1999), giving selected results from OECD publications. 
Other countries which have seen a growth in inequality include the United 
Kingdom (not shown in the chart, but the increase in the Gini coefficient from 
0.280 to 0.330 is larger than any other country except New Zealand), the United 
States, and to a lesser extent Australia. These three countries, however, 
experienced most of their growth in inequality during the 1970s to 1980s period, 
in contrast with New Zealand, where the increase occurred between the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
 
Chart 3:   Distribution of Household Gross Incomes,  
HES data, comparing 1983/84-1985/86 profile with 1995/96-1997/98 profile 
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10.  It is easy to jump to the conclusion that an increase in inequality is ‘bad’. That is 
not necessarily the case. For example, it is possible to envisage an income 
distribution which is so equal that there is little incentive for effort, and in 
consequence the community and its members are worse off than they would 
otherwise be. Or income inequality could increase because the “rich get richer” 
while at the same time the poor are no worse off, or perhaps even better off 
themselves. To judge whether this latter case is an improvement or not requires 
some form of ‘social welfare function’ (which not all members of society will 
necessarily adhere to) which takes distributional objectives explicitly into 
account. Atkinson (1983) has developed measures which can take into account 
the importance society attaches to redistribution towards the bottom. 
 
 
11.  Table 1 summarises numerically the change shown in Chart 3. It gives key 
results from the Hyslop and Maré work. Five different summary measures of 
inequality are given, with the change in each from 1983-86 to 1995-98. (All, 
except the Gini coefficient, are in terms of logarithms of income.) The different 
measures are discussed in a little more detail in Appendix A. An increase in 
inequality is shown, for every measure given here, by an increase in numerical 
value. All the measures, except the 50-10 percentile ratio, show an increase in 
inequality.  
 
Chart 4:   Growth in New Zealand's Income Inequality, relative to other countries. 
1970s-1990s. Equivalent Disposable Household Income.
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12.  With the one exception, all these increases are substantial. The first three 
measures can be considered to measure changes for the distribution as a whole. 





percentiles – measure changes in the upper and lower halves of the distribution, 
respectively, rather than for the whole distribution. 
 
13.  The Gini coefficient is probably the most widely used and best known measure 
of inequality. Its derivation and interpretation is explained in some detail in the 
Appendix. For most of the results that follow, changes are given in terms of the 
Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient can theoretically take values in the range 
from 0 to 1. In practice the usual values seen for household or family income lie 
in the range from 0.25 to 0.45, depending on the country and the income 
measure used.  
 
14.  A change in the Gini coefficient needs to be of size 0.01 (e.g. from 0.33 to 0.34) 
or larger before it can be regarded as having much practical significance; and 
larger still if based on sample survey data and one wishes to be sure the change 
is statistically significant. Statistics NZ has calculated (Statistics NZ, 1999; 
Appendix A3) that any change in the Gini coefficient for equivalised household 
disposable income between different years as measured from annual HES data 
needs to be 0.033 or larger before it can be claimed to be statistically significant 
at the 95% confidence level. This is for household disposable income, 
equivalised, and the required increases for statistical significance would be 
larger for other measures, particularly market income, but of the same order of 
magnitude. 
 
15.  The use of three years’ survey data combined, by Hyslop and Maré, means that 
the difference between different periods can be smaller and still be statistically 
significant. Given this, the change in the Gini coefficient for household gross 
income in table 1 can be taken as being statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. 
Table 1: Shifts in summary measures of inequality - 1983-86 to 1995-98
Gross Household Income
Hyslop & Mare, 1999
Measure 1983-86 1995-98 Change
Gini coefficient 0.347 0.398 0.051
SD (log income) 0.717 0.781 0.064
Inter-Quartile Range 0.943 1.085 0.141
90-50 percentile ratio 0.715 0.904 0.188





The analyses by Hyslop and Maré show an increase in inequality of household gross 
incomes over the period from 1983-86 to 1995-98. The increase is statistically 
significant. 
 
The increase in New Zealand’s income inequality appears to have exceeded that 
observed also in some other (mainly ‘Anglo-Saxon’) countries. It is inadvisable to 
compare measures of income inequality directly between countries, because of 
differences in methods of data collection and treatment. It can be safely said, 
however, that New Zealand ranks higher internationally in terms of income inequality 




A.3  The results of other analyses 
 
Analyses using Household Economic Survey (HES) data 
 
16.  Do other studies confirm these results? First, some additional tabulations were 
done for this paper by Statistics NZ, giving income distributions from the 
Household Economic Survey for the four years 1981/82, 1985/86, 1990/91 and 
1995/96. This was for individuals and households, for Market, Gross, and 
Disposable income, actual and equivalised. The charts are given in the statistical 
appendix. In brief they show the same picture as Hyslop and Maré. Each 
distribution became flatter, with higher proportions in the upper tail. That is, 
Hyslop and Maré’s results are not a result of their particular choice of income 
measure. The shift in all cases occurred mainly between 1985/86 and 1990/91. 
 
17.  Second, Table 2 presents published results from two other recent New Zealand 
studies, using Household Economic Survey data, by Podder and Chatterjee 
(1998) and Statistics NZ (1999). The dates and income concepts used differ.  
However both show substantial increases in the Gini coefficient – i.e. increases 
in inequality – over the 1980s to 1990s period, of a similar order of magnitude 
to that in Hyslop and Maré. Indeed the Statistics NZ increase is somewhat larger 
in magnitude than for the other studies, of about 0.07 in total. The numbers in 
Table 2 point to the increase being concentrated in the late 1980s, though with 
some further increase thenceforth. 
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18.  It is convenient here to make a first mention of one of the potential contributors 
to the change in inequality. Namely changes in the proportions of different 
household types, which can be labelled a ‘demographic’ change. The alternative 
Statistics NZ series show the effects of such change (a detailed breakdown, into 
15 types, is used). For Actual Household Market income, the increase from 
1985/86 to 1995/96 was 0.077. With the “demographic adjustment” this reduces 
to 0.064. That is, the changes in household proportions appear to explain 0.013, 
or 17 percent, of the total increase in inequality for household market income 
over the period. However, the contribution from this factor to the increase in 
inequality of Disposable Equivalent Income is negligible. In part at least this is 
because the income differences between different household types are much 
reduced when measured in terms of Disposable Equivalent Income, compared 
with Actual Market Income. For example, many sole parent and pensioner 
households have no market income, but all have some disposable income, 
however modest, after receiving benefits and pensioners.  
 
19.  The Statistics NZ series of annual Gini coefficients for Household Equivalent 
Disposable income, given in Chart 5, suggests that much of the increase in 
inequality was concentrated in the period 1987/88 to 1990/91. A recent paper by 
Bakker and Creedy (1999) associates this timing of the increase with the 
‘business cycle’. The economy moved into recession at the end of the 1980s, 
and entered a recovery phase from 1991. This undoubtedly affected to some 
extent the timing of the increase, but leaves to be explained the fact that 
inequality did not fall back towards its earlier level during the 1990s. 
 
20.  Mowbray (1993) is another report using HES data and showing the increase in 
inequality in later part of the 1980s. (Publication currently being updated - 
Mowbray, 2000.)  
 
 
Table 2: Increase in Gini Coefficients; Other New Zealand studies
Concept 1983/84 1985/86 1990/91 1991/92 1995/96
Podder & 
  Chatterjee Gross Equiv. 0.353 0.382 0.404
Statistics NZ Market Actual 0.394 0.453 0.471
- with Demog. Adj. 0.407 0.454 0.471
Statistics NZ Disposable Equiv. 0.254 0.305 0.322
- with Demog. Adj. 0.255 0.303 0.322
Notes: The Statistics NZ numbers are after adjusting for HES variation; ie for differential non-response
  by household type. See Appendix A.3 of the Statistics NZ report.
 The 'Demog.Adj' coefficients are then further adjusted for changes in household type proportions
   standardising on 1995/96.  30 
 
 
Analyses using Census incomes data 
 
21.  A common feature of all the analyses so far discussed in this section is that they 
are based on Household Economic Survey (HES) data. That they seem to be in 
good agreement might conceivably, therefore, be the result of some flaw in the 
common data source. 
 
22.  The only practicable alternative to HES as an information source on income 
distribution is the five-yearly census of population and dwellings. Fortunately a 
number of recent papers by Martin (1997a, 1997b, and 1998b), based on his 
thesis (1998a) have explored changes in inequality shown by the census data. 
 
23.  Census data on incomes are not perfect. There is a reasonable degree of non-
response – around 15 percent, and higher for some ethnic groups, including 
Mäori. The overall response rate is, however, higher than for HES (about 80 
percent). In recent censuses, since 1981, census respondents have been asked to 
give ‘Gross’ income, that is pre-tax, including benefits. Martin equivalised the 
income of sub-groups of families, using the Whiteford scale, which has values 
very similar to the Revised Jensen scale. In fact, in his words he ‘semi-
equivalised’ the data, as it was not possible to equivalise the incomes of 
individual families. (Martin, 1998a, page 70.) Respondents give the income 
interval in which they fall, rather than their exact income. This poses a problem 
in estimating mean income in the interval, which is at its most serious for the 
open-ended topmost income interval. Martin addresses this problem by the 
standard technique of fitting a Pareto distribution for the top end of the income 
distribution. (Martin, 1998a, page 59; Easton, 1983, page 28). 
 
24.  Martin’s work extends back to 1951 for individuals. However useful data on 
family incomes only begins from the 1976 census. Market income was collected 
in that year. In 1981 the attempt was made to collect market income and Social 
   Chart 5:  Gini Coefficients 1987/88 to 1996/97.   
Household Equivalent Disposable Income.  
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Security benefit income separately; an attempt which unfortunately caused 
much misunderstanding and affected the quality of census data for that year to 
an unknown extent (Brosnan; 1986). Gross income has been collected in 
subsequent censuses. Martin has adjusted 1976 data to a comparable basis to 
later years, and presented analyses from 1976 to the latest, 1996, census. 
 
25.  Martin calculated measures of income inequality for families. These were made 
up of four household types, these being ‘parenting’ (dependent children) and 
‘non-parenting’ couples (male aged up to 59), and sole parent female and sole 
parent male households. That is, his results for families are for a sub-set of all 
households. They exclude sole-person households and ‘extended families’, 
which are included in some broader definitions of ‘family’ – for example, the 
‘economic family’ defined in the Statistics NZ 1996 census report Families and 
Households as “a financial unit consisting of either a financially interdependent 
group of people who live together or a financially independent person.” (op. cit. 
Page 17). Another definition of family is the ‘income unit’ or ‘inner family’ 
concept used in Australia (Redmond, 1998); comprising single people and 





26.  Table 3 gives Martin’s key results in terms of Gini coefficients. Income 
inequality increased somewhat between 1976 and 1981, fell from 1981 to 1986, 
and then rose very sharply to 1991, and again by a substantial amount to 1996. 
These results hold both for ‘All families’ and ‘Employed families’, as well as 
individual males, ‘All’ and ‘Employed’. 
 
27.  In summary, Martin’s census-based results are in good agreement with the 
survey-based results in the reports by Hyslop and Maré, Podder and Chatterjee, 
and Statistics NZ. It is important to note, however, that Martin’s results are for 
‘sole parent’ or ‘couple’ families, and also exclude elderly couples, so are for a 
part only of the total population of private households covered in the other 
analyses. 
Table 3:  A comparison of Census Income Inequality 1976-1996 as 
Measured by the Gini Coefficient: Families and Men 
1976  1981  1986  1991  1996 
A: All Labour Force statuses 
Families  0.3108  0.3325  0.313  0.3731  0.4017 
Men  0.3724  0.3982  0.3734  0.4364  0.476 
B: Employed Only 
Families  0.2753  0.2995  0.2779  0.3174  0.3517 
Men  0.3013  0.3213  0.3154  0.3779  0.4373 
Note:   'Employed' families include couple families where one or both partners are employed full-time; 
 and Sole parents, either part-time or full-time. But not Couples if only employment is part-time. 
 The latter is an insignificant category. 
Source:  Martin 1998a.  Table 11.4.   32 
 
28.  Martin’s work also provides useful information on long-term trends in income 
inequality, although prior to 1976 for individuals only. Up until the early or 
mid-1970s there had been an ongoing slight reduction in income inequality, at 
least for the post-war period. This was accompanied by a steady increase in the 
real value of incomes. Then, as shown in Table 3, inequality increased from 
1976 to 1981, fell from 1981 to 1986, perhaps because of the strong economic 
growth New Zealand experienced in the early 1980s; and since 1986 has risen 
sharply. 
 
29.  Up until 1976, the outcomes could be said to be consistent with the ‘Kuznets 
hypothesis’; that “income inequalities will actually increase during 
industrialisation or modernisation, but will eventually fall to a lower degree of 
inequality when industrialisation has been completed and then stabilise.”   
(Kuznets, 1955). But not since 1976.  
 
30.  Aghion et. al. (1999) provide an up-to-date review of theoretical developments 
in this area. They conclude, first, that for countries with imperfect capital 
markets, a redistribution to the less well-off can increase economic growth; and, 
second, that technical change, particularly ‘general purpose technologies’ 
affecting the whole economic system (e.g. computers), helps explain the recent 
upsurge in wage inequality in a number of developed economies, including New 
Zealand. The question they pose is whether or not this increase is beginning to 
level off, perhaps eventually reducing. They think there is “an important 
efficiency role for sustained redistribution.” (Op. cit. Page 1656.) 
 
 
Section Summary: Confirmation that cross-sectional income inequality has 
increased 
 
Two further major recent studies using Household Economic Survey data also show 
that there were substantial increases in cross-sectional household income inequality 
over the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. The three used differing income 
concepts, and somewhat different time periods, but all three recorded increases in 
excess of any likely sampling error. 
 
An alternative source for incomes data is the census. A study of income inequality 
trends using census incomes data gave similar results to the three HES-based reports. 
Income inequality for families rose very strongly between the 1986 and 1991 
censuses, and continued to increase for 1991 to 1996. Some care is needed, however, 
in comparing these census-based results, which are for ‘families’, defined as sole 
parent or couple families (male aged under 60), with the HES-based analyses, which 
are for all households. 
 
The analyses taken together confirm that inequality increased, and increased very 
substantially, in excess of any likely statistical errors. In general the rate of increase 
was largest in the late 1980s, but has continued into the 1990s. 
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Part B:  Interpretation Of The Changes – In Static 
  And Dynamic Terms 
 
B.1  What have the changes meant for population sub-groups? 
 
1.  The earlier Chart 2 gave a “cross-sectional” or “static” picture of the income 
distribution at a given period. Ideally we would know as well the ‘dynamics’ of 
this distribution; that is how the incomes of the individual households making 
up the distribution change from period to period and, in doing so, form new and 
perhaps quite different distributions. The knowledge we currently have of 
‘income dynamics’ is discussed in later sections. In many respects it is quite 
limited, and for most of our analyses we have to rely on ‘cross-sectional’ 
measures of the income distribution. These can, however, still tell us quite a bit.  
Cross-sectional analyses at different points in time can be used to show how the 
community as a whole, and different groups in the community have fared over 
the intervening period.  
  
2.  This is illustrated graphically in a number of different ways below. The first 
approach is to examine how the ‘average’ or ’typical’ household has fared, by 
tracking the change over time in the average or arithmetic mean, or in some 
other ‘central’ measure such as the median. The median is the income of the 
household precisely at the midpoint of the ranking of households from top to 
bottom. 
 
3.  Chart 6 shows the changes in average household disposable income and also in 
median household income, from 1981/82 to 1995/96, based on Household 
Economic Survey (HES) data (Statistics NZ, 1999. Page 67.). The values in the 
chart are ‘actual’ incomes. That is, they have not been adjusted for changes in 
household size and composition. Average household size fell over this period, 
from 3.02 persons per household in 1981/82 to 2.74 persons per household in 
1995/96, or by about 9 percent.  
 
4.  The median is not affected by changes in the ‘tails’ of the income distribution in 
the way that the mean is. This shows clearly in the chart. Mean income increased 
from 1986 to 1996, by 0.4 percent per year (equivalent to 0.7 percent per year if 
adjusted for the fall in average household size and other changes in household 
composition). Over the same period median household income fell. The mean 
increased because of the increased share of income received by households in the 
upper part of the income distribution, rather than because of a general increase for 
all households.    34 
 
5.  This is an unusual situation in that means and medians usually move more or 
less in parallel. The fact that they have not in recent years shows in itself that 
there have been significant changes to the income distribution. These disparate 
trends have bedevilled discussion of ‘poverty’ over this period. If a ‘poverty 
line’ is defined as some percentage of the median, as it often is by researchers in 
the area, then a decline in the median can result in a lower percentage of 
families apparently being ‘in poverty’, even when the position of those near the 
bottom end of the distribution is perhaps worsening, and their numbers 
increasing. To instead define poverty relative to the mean might on the other 
hand show an increasing percentage, when perhaps ‘genuine’ poverty is not 
increasing. 
 
6.  One approach to tracking change over the whole range of the income 
distribution is shown in Chart 7. It shows trends in equivalent household 
disposable income at different points in the income distribution – the ten 
‘decile’ groups from the poorest 10 percent of households in decile 1 to the 
richest 10 percent in decile 10. There is some fall in average income for the 
bottom two deciles over the 1982 to 1996 period, not by very large amounts 
statistically, (4 to 5 percent), but certainly significant for those on low incomes. 
The falls are larger in percentage terms in the ‘middle’ deciles – between 8 and 
11 percent for deciles 3 to 5, and between 5 and 7.5 percent for deciles 6 and 7.  
 
Chart 6:  Trends in Mean and Median Household Disposable Income.
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7.   The feature that stands out is the 32.4 percent increase in average income for the 
top decile. Most of this occurred between the 1986 and 1991 surveys. It has to 
be added that because these estimates are based on sample survey data, the 
inter-period changes for any given decile are not necessarily statistically 
significant – they could fall within the range of possible sampling error. As 
mentioned earlier, however, in Part A, the Statistics NZ 1999 report shows that 
the increased inequality for the distribution as a whole is definitely statistically 
significant. 
 
8.  It appears then that households in the lower and middle income deciles have 
suffered a loss in economic wellbeing over this period. And those in the top 10 
percent have improved their absolute and relative position very significantly. In 
saying this, it should be remembered that households change over time, and 
move up and down the income distribution. Those households in the bottom 
decile in the 1980s will not be identical to those in the bottom decile in 1996. 
 
9.  Another approach is to look at the experience of different household types. 
 
10.   Chart 8, again for household equivalent disposable income, gives a breakdown 
by household ‘life-stage’ type.  ‘Couple’ households, with or without children, 
have been sub-categorised according to the age of the female partner. Some 
caution is needed in assuming that inter-period changes are statistically 
significant, but it appears that –  
 
-  Sole parent households suffered a worsening in their economic position; 
-  As also did “sole occupant’ households with the occupant aged under 40; 
-  ‘Elderly’ households improved their position (sole occupant) or held their 
own (couple, female aged 65+); 
 
Chart 7:  Average Household Equivalent Disposable Income by Decile. 1982-1996.  
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-  ‘Couple with children’ families in general improved their economic 






11.  Yet another approach to the tracking of welfare changes over time, using cross-
sectional studies, is to examine changes in the characteristics of the individuals 
and households within broad income bands. The OECD report (Atkinson, et. al., 
1995), based on the Luxembourg Income Study, split households and 
individuals into three relative income bands. The middle band ranged from 80 
percent of the median to 150 percent, with the bottom band under 80 percent, 
and the top band above 150 percent. 
 
12.   The Statistics NZ 1999 report contained a number of charts using this approach. 
Chart 9 reproduces Figure 5.8 in that report. It displays clearly the shift of 
households out of the ‘middle’ band between 1985/86 and 1990/91; mostly to 
the top band, but some to the bottom band.  
 
Statistics NZ (1999) Figure 5.6




































Source: Statistics New  Zealand, Household Economic Surveys
Sole Occupant Couple w ithout Children
w here female aged
Couple w ith Children w here female aged  37 
 
13.  This way of depicting change in the income distribution is also useful for 
comparing the experience of sub-populations. For example, ethnic groups. 
Chart 10 for the ‘European’ ethnic group shows that the proportion of European 
individuals in the upper income band rose by an amount almost exactly equal to 
the fall in the middle income band. For Mäori individuals, shown in Chart 11, 
the ‘squeeze’ was definitely out of the middle band to the bottom band, notably 
in the 1986 to 1991 period, with some recovery by 1996. This seems consistent 
with the discussion in Chapple and Rea (1998), who found using HLFS data 
that for Mäori  ... “ all the deterioration [in labour market outcomes] occurred 
between 1985 and 1992.” (page 143).  
 
 
Chart 9:  Distribution of Households relative to bands around the Median. 
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Chart 10:  Distribution of Europeans, by their household income, across bands around Median of  






















Chart 11:  Distribution of Maori, by their Household Income, across bands around the Median of  
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14.   Next, we see what might be deduced from examining cross-sectional ‘profiles’ 
of individuals’ incomes by gender, age, and educational qualification. This is in 
anticipation of discussion in the following ‘Dynamics’ section on following 
sub-population cohorts through time. 
 
The influence of age and education on income 
 
15.   Chart 12 shows that there is a systematic lifecycle component to differences in 
income. Males and females are shown separately in this chart of average income 
by age, derived from the 1996 Census (Coleman, in recent unpublished work on 
the Life-Cycle model and savings. 1999). The profile for males is a typical 
‘inverted U’, peaking in the age-range 45-49. Younger males are more likely to 
still be in full- or part-time study and not earning. As skills and experience are 
acquired, incomes increase until the peak in middle age. For older ages, people 
may choose to work less, or take early retirement, and some older workers’ 
skills may become ‘obsolete’. For women, the profile is different, in part 
because of child-bearing and domestic responsibilities. This accounts for the fall 
in average female income in the early 30s age-group, before a rise to a second 
peak in the 45-49 age-group.  
 
16.   The averages in Chart 12 include those with ‘nil’ income; that is with no (or 
negative) market income, and no benefit income. If ‘nil’ incomes are instead 
excluded, the average incomes at each age are higher, but the profiles remain 







Chart 12:  Average Individual Income by age and gender; 1996.  
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17.   Chart 13 shows, for males, changes over time in income at given ages, again 
drawing on Coleman’s paper. Average income at each selected age is plotted 
over seven censuses. Until 1981 there is a progressive increase in income at 
each age from census to census. From 1981 to 1986 there is a sharp fall across 
almost all ages, and a similar or even larger fall from 1986 to 1991. The chart 
for women – not shown here - shows continuing increases up until 1986 and 




18.    Something very significant clearly happened to male income growth in the 
1980s. Coleman attributes the outcome for males, plausibly, to the “farming 
downturn, and the shake-outs within many industrial sectors post 1984”. A 
decline in labour force participation undoubtedly played a large part in bringing 
average incomes down. Females were perhaps also more affected than the 
simple comparison with male trends suggests. The very strong growth in female 
average incomes up to 1986, much stronger than that for males, came to a very 
sudden halt in the 1986-1991 inter-censal period. 
 
19.   An additional dimension to that of age is given in Charts 14 and 15, which 
presents part of Sholeh Maani’s work on income profiles by age and educational 
qualification.  These charts show that workers with a more advanced 
qualification on average experience larger increases in income early in their 
working careers, have significantly higher incomes than less educated workers 
especially during their prime and later working years, and also that their income 
peaks on average later in life. 
 
 
  Chart 13:  Male Earnings by Age. 
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20.   Not just individuals’ incomes but household incomes also vary with ‘life-stage’. 
This was apparent in Chart 8 above. Extracting the 1996 data for ‘couple with 
children’ households from that chart gives Chart 16, showing how the age 





21.   Cross-sectional studies are able then to tell us some interesting things about 
income changes over time. The comparisons they provide are for population 
sub-groups, and not for individuals. 
 
Chart 16:  Average Equivalent Disposable income of 'Couple with Children' households,  
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Section summary: The preceding material shows, using cross-sectional studies, that, 
over the period 1981/82 to 1995/96 – 
 
-  average real household disposable income was by 1995/96 approximately the 
same as in 1981/82, but the income of the median household had fallen 
significantly, 
-  mean household disposable incomes in most parts of the income range fell, but 
those of the top 10 percent rose considerably,  
-  the mean income of some household types (e.g. sole parent households) appears 
to have fallen, and that of others (e.g. mature ‘couple with children’ 
households) improved, 
-  the ‘spreading out’ of the income distribution saw Europeans tending to move 
upwards from the middle-income range, and Mäori downwards, particularly in 
the 1985/86 to 1990/91 period.  
 
Individuals’ incomes are to a considerable extent determined by age and gender. 
Average income for males increases with age to a peak in middle age, and then 
declines. Average female incomes are lower than corresponding male averages, and 
after peaking in the 25-29 age-group, are lower on average in the 30s age-groups, 
before rising to another peak in the 45-49 age-group. 
 
The level of educational qualification also shapes the income profile over time. The 
higher the qualification, the higher the average income profile. Females’ average 
incomes for a given age and qualification level are well below those of males.  
 
Changes over time in the overall income distribution occur in part because of 
changes in the age composition of the population, in the gender composition of the 




B.2  Income Dynamics 
22.   Cross-sectional, or ‘static’, tabulations, of the kind illustrated in the previous 
section, have been for many years the standard way of analysing income 
distributions. That this approach tells only part of the story, and that the 
underlying dynamics should be investigated, has also been realised. Barker 
(1996) for example strongly advocated a new ‘dynamics’ approach to incomes 
analysis. Survey developments in recent years, in the form of longitudinal panel 
studies, are gradually making analyses of income dynamics more feasible.  
 
23.  A ‘dynamics’ approach tries to follow individual incomes over time. The 
information obtained helps to answer questions such as whether people, or 
households, tend to remain over time at a relatively fixed point in the income   44 
distribution, or whether instead they show considerable mobility?
3 Such 
knowledge is particularly useful when developing policies to help those in the 
bottom income group. It would be invaluable to know to what extent those in 
this group tend to remain there, or whether instead they can be expected to 
move up the income distribution in succeeding periods. Or if there are 
representatives of both groups, as is the case, it is again valuable for policy 
purposes to know how to distinguish those in the two categories.  
 
24.    The material below surveys briefly the currently available information on 
income dynamics for New Zealand. First, we see what might be deduced from 
following sub-population cohorts over time. Next, results from the two available 
‘longitudinal’ datasets – Inland Revenue tax records for individuals, and the 
Christchurch Health and Development Study (CHDS) – are appraised. The tax 
data has been used for general studies of income mobility, and also to study the 
effects of welfare dependence. The CHDS data provides evidence on ‘poverty 





Income paths of cohorts 
 
25.    Cohort paths over time can be constructed from a series of cross-sectional 
profiles, of the kind shown earlier from papers by Coleman and Maani. Thus an 
age-group cohort aged 20-24 in 1981 is assumed to receive the average for age-
group 25-29 in 1986, age-group 30-34 in 1991 and so on. Maani (1999; 
Appendix D) tracks in this way average income over the period 1981 to 1996 
                                                 
3    Conceptually one might distinguish between ‘income mobility’, having the sense of significant 
changes up or down, and ‘income volatility’, meaning essentially random changes.  Empirically the 
two are not so easily differentiated.  
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for selected age-groups and educational qualifications. The averages are for 
employed males and females. Chart 17 is a specimen for the cohort aged 21-25 
in 1981 and having either “year 12” qualifications (UE or Sixth-form certificate) 
or a bachelor’s degree. (The price deflator for these series has been changed to 
that excluding GST.) Real income rises strongly for the male ’bachelors’ cohort 
over the 15 year period, and also reasonably strongly for males with ‘year 12’ 
qualifications. These cohort paths reflect the average experience for those 
employed throughout. The paths followed by the female cohorts are much lower 
and flatter, reflecting the cross-sectional profile shown earlier.  
 
26.   If incomes across the age-range all increase over time at the same real rate, each 
successive cohort should trace out a profile lying above the previous cohort. 
Andrew Coleman, checked on this using census data. Some results are shown in 
Chart 18. It should be noted that this chart gives median incomes rather than 
average incomes, whereas the chart from Maani is for average incomes, as also 
is the earlier chart from Coleman’s work. The chart has been simplified from 




27.   Up until the 1981 census (age 35 for those aged 20 in 1966, age 30 for those 
aged 20 in 1971 and so on) this pattern is followed. In 1986 there is a sharp 
break. The income for each cohort falls well below that of the cohort 5 years 
older, instead of continuing above it.  
 
28.   This reversal follows from the downturn in male average incomes in the 1980s, 
shown in the earlier chart from Coleman’s paper. It is important to note that 
these cohort income paths are for all males, except those reporting ‘nil’ income. 
They include in fact, as well as those in employment, most of those not in 
employment also, as these will not in general have ‘nil’ income because the 
Chart 18:  Earnings Profile by Age : Successive Cohorts
Male Median Income (excluding  income reported as zero)
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census definition of income includes income from benefits and other sources as 
well as from earnings. Maani’s cohort income paths, on the other hand, are for 
‘employed’ persons, and do not show a dip in the 1980s. In other words the 
sharp break in incomes is not caused by a fall in the income of those employed 
throughout. It is because the number of ‘not employed’ increased, and this 
dragged down average incomes. 
 
 
Summary of points in preceding section 
 
A first approach to investigating income dynamics is to track average or median 
income paths for sub-population cohorts, for example tracking the average income of 
persons born in a given five-year period over successive censuses. With continuing 
economic growth, the path of each successive cohort by age would be expected to lie 
above that of the preceding cohort, measured in real dollars. This did not happen in 
the 1980s. Instead average real incomes of males in most cohorts fell below those of 
preceding cohorts. This was due to the fall in male labour force participation (female 
participation also fell, but by less, and recovered fairly quickly), and increase in 





Longitudinal analyses using the IRD data-set 
 
29.   There is one substantial longitudinal income data-set available in New Zealand, 
that being the IRD database of individual income tax returns. This consists of a 
stratified random sample of all tax returns, the sample design being such that the 
same individuals remain in the sample from year to year. The data-set also 
draws on Tax Deduction Certificates which are filed by payers who withhold 
PAYE tax from individuals’ earnings.  These payers are primarily employers 
and the Department of Social Welfare.  This provides information on the 
income of individuals who do not file IR returns. 
 
30.   The data-set is not, however, ideal.  
 
-  (i) Tax-declared income can deviate from other concepts of income; 
-  (ii) Only minimal personal details are available – gender and age, and 
gender is in fact imputed from the person’s title; 
-  (iii) There are sometimes difficulties in linking income returns when a 
PAYE taxpayer’s income drops below the level at which a  personal tax 
return is required; and this probably biases the data-set towards higher-
income earners (see Hyslop for details); 
-  (iv) There are ongoing ‘births’ and ‘deaths’ to the data-set – new labour-
force entrants, or those re-entering, retirements and deaths, persons 
migrating overseas, or immigrants. This does have the advantage, 
compared with a longitudinal sample, of maintaining the cross-sectional 
representativeness of the sample. 
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31.   Analyses from the data-set need, therefore, to be done with some care. Both 
Creedy (1997b) and, in particular, Hyslop (Feb. 1999) discuss these problems 
and ways of overcoming them. 
 
32.    Smith and Templeton (1990) were the first to examine income mobility for 
1980s data using IRD data-sets. They constructed ‘transition matrices’ showing 
the proportions of taxpayers moving between different income quintiles (fifths) 
over differing lengths of time (examples of such matrices are shown below from 
Hyslop’s most recent work). These showed what appeared, subjectively at least, 
quite high degrees of mobility over time, with those in one quintile at the 
starting date gradually spreading more and more over other quintiles in 
subsequent years. Although there still typically remained some concentration in 
the original quintile, it appeared that the degree of mobility up and down the 
income distribution was relatively high.    
 
33.   There are, however, some ‘traps for beginners’ in this form of analysis (see 
discussion in Gardiner and Hills, 1999). First, there may be ‘regression to the 
mean’ effects. Random variation would lead, for example, to a number of those 
in the top quintile in the base period being there as a result of chance variation 
from their ‘usual’ income in a lower quintile, and therefore more likely to drop 
to a lower quintile in subsequent periods. A similar effect would apply for the 
bottom quintile. That is, some of the apparent volatility can be thought of more 
as a  ‘return to normal’ from a variant starting position. That is, ‘regression to 
the mean’ effects can exaggerate the true degree of mobility. They can also 
exaggerate the true amount of inequality.  
 
34.   Second, some of the income mobility from quintile to quintile is undoubtedly a 
result of ‘ageing’ effects. The ‘inverted U’ distribution of income with age, at 
least for males, means that young people entering the workforce will typically 
be increasing their income from year to year, some of them rapidly. At the other 
end of the working life, income tends to fall away from its peak in the 40s or 
early 50s, and of course usually falls sharply on retirement. 
 
35.   Thus any estimates of income mobility need to be controlled for age effects, as 
is done by Stroombergen et. al. (1995, using 1991 to 1993 data), Creedy (1997, 
for the same three years), and Hyslop (1999). Hyslop achieves this by 
estimating income quintiles separately for each year of age, over the main 
working-life span from 20 to 65, and examining inter-quintile movements over 
the four-year period 1994 to 1998 in terms of these age-specific quintiles. 
(Hyslop found that age-associated differences in income account for only about 
10 percent of overall inequality.) 
 
36.  Hyslop’s latest analyses covered the four year period 1994 to 1998. He 
examined  
 
  (a) Transition matrices 
(b) Income correlation over time (till 1997 only) 
 
37.   Transition Matrices.  Some typical transitional matrices for movements between 
income quintiles are exhibited in tables 4 and 5, drawing on Hyslop’s work.   48 
 
38.   Tables 4 and 5 are one-year and four-year transition matrices respectively, taken 
from Hyslop’s updated work including the 1998 tax year. For presentational 
purposes they are simplified here to include transitions between only the five 
positive income quintiles – excluding the details of ‘Missing data’, ‘Negative 
income’ and ‘zero income’ states. These last three amount to between 20 and 
25 percent of all observations, mostly in the ‘Missing data’ and ‘Zero income’ 
categories. The full matrices are given as Tables 4A and 4D in the Statistical 
Appendix. 
 
39.   To illustrate their working, Table 4 shows that males in market income quintile 
1 (the lowest positive income bracket) have an estimated 48.2 percent chance of 
being in that quintile in the following year, and a 19.2 percent chance of moving 
up to the second quintile, and so on. Males in the top income quintile for their 
age have a 74.8 percent chance of being still in the top quintile the following 
year, a 13.3 percent chance of having dropped to the fourth quintile, and so on. 
The percentages are similar for females. It should be noted that quite large 
percentages also move in and out of the ‘Missing’ or ‘zero income’ or ‘negative 
income’ categories, particularly in the lowest quintile. Some of this is shown in 
the final column in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
40.    Table 5 shows that over a four-year period, male taxpayers in the bottom 
quintile in Year 1 have a 30.6 percent chance of being still in the bottom 
quintile in the fifth year, a 20 percent chance of having moved up one quintile, 
etc. For the top quintile, the estimated probability of still being in that quintile 
after four years is 55.9 percent. The distribution among quintiles, for each 
starting quintile, is flatter after 4 years than after 1 year.  
 
41.  As Hyslop points out, analyses in terms of these matrices are not sensitive to 
‘outliers’ in the way that the correlation coefficients are (as discussed below), 
but on the other hand show only the larger ‘inter-quintile’ movements, and are 
insensitive to ‘intra-quartile’ movements. 
 
42.   An important question is whether income variation from one year to the next 
has any connection to income variation in earlier or later years. A simple test is 
that if changes in any one year are completely independent of other years, the 
four-year transition matrix should equal the one-year matrix raised to the fourth 
power. 
 
43.   An arithmetical check for each of the male and female matrices shows this not 
to be the case. Raising the one-year matrices to the fourth power gives much 
flatter distributions, or in different words much lower coefficients on the 
principal diagonal, than do the four-year matrices. For instance 21.9 per cent 
and 39.8 percent likelihoods for Q1 to Q1 and Q5 to Q5 transitions respectively 
for males; compared with the actual four-year transition probabilities of 30.6 
and 55.9 percent given above. Similar results hold for the female matrices. 
 
44.  This has important implications for micro-simulation modelling of income 
change over time. It is not sufficient to apply a constant one-year transition 
matrix to model the change from one year to the next, independently of changes   49 
in earlier years. Actual transition probabilities require a more complex statistical 
generating model. Stroombergen et. al. (1995) use two-year transition 
probabilities, but this also is probably too much of a simplification. 
 
 
Table 4:  One-Year Market Income Transition Probabilities, 1994-98 
 
 
First-Year                                           Second-Year State    
State    Positive Market Income Quintile                   ‘Missing’ or zero 






st Quintile   0.482 0.192 0.062 0.027 0.012   0.226 
 
 2
nd Quintile   0.160  0.488 0.196 0.058 0.028   0.071 
 
 3
rd Quintile   0.054  0.159  0.539 0.173 0.045   0.030 
 
 4
th Quintile   0.027 0.054 0.139 0.596 0.163   0.022   
 






st Quintile   0.442 0.203 0.062 0.025 0.012   0.257 
 
 2
nd Quintile   0.150  0.443 0.216 0.060 0.024   0.107 
 
 3
rd Quintile   0.056  0.161  0.489 0.195 0.047   0.055 
 
 4
th Quintile   0.024 0.052 0.144 0.572 0.177   0.032 
 




Notes: Entries are relative frequencies of being in the Second-year state, conditional 
on being in the First-year state, averaged over the 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 
1997-98 transitions.  Income quintiles are age-specific quintiles, based on all positive 
sample incomes.  Sample sizes = 23,197 males; 22,887 females. 
 
Source: Hyslop 1999   50 
 
Table 5:  Four-Year Market Income Transition Probabilities, 1994-98 
 
 
First-Year                                              Fifth-Year State 
State    Positive Market Income Quintile                  ‘Missing’ or zero 






st Quintile   0.306 0.200 0.115 0.069 0.041   0.270 
 
 2
nd Quintile   0.157  0.292  0.217 0.111 0.070   0.154 
 
 3
rd Quintile   0.087  0.179  0.343 0.207 0.091   0.093 
 
 4
th Quintile   0.062 0.094 0.164 0.386 0.211   0.083 
 






st Quintile   0.251 0.197 0.121 0.071 0.044   0.316 
 
 2
nd Quintile   0.145  0.240 0.219 0.134 0.076   0.185 
 
 3
rd Quintile   0.086  0.160  0.261 0.230 0.101   0.163 
 
 4
th Quintile   0.056 0.086 0.150 0.341 0.246   0.121 
 




Notes: Entries are relative frequencies of being in the Fourth-year state, conditional 
on being in the First-year state, over the 1994-98 transitions.  Income quintiles are 
age-specific quintiles, based on all positive sample incomes.  Sample sizes = 23,197 
males; 22,887 females. 
 
Source: Hyslop 1999 
 
 
   51
45.   Income correlation. If all incomes changed by exactly the same amount from 
period to period then they would be perfectly correlated over time, and the 
correlation coefficient measuring this would have a value of unity. If income is 
highly volatile from period to period, with a large ‘transitory’ component during 
any given period, we would expect a low correlation of individuals’ incomes 
between any two specified periods, and that the correlation coefficient would 
continue to decline over longer time-spans. This is what Hyslop's results seem 
to show. Table 6 gives averages of correlation coefficients over 1, 2, and 3 year 
periods. (Hyslop’s Tables 5A and 5B; the correlations being in terms of 
logarithms of income) 
 
 
 Table 6. Correlation Coefficients of Taxpayer incomes over time: 
         Using IRD 1994-97 data, individuals aged 20-65 
 
   Market Income   Disposable Income 
   1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs   1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 
 
Males   0.70 0.57 0.47   0.69 0.57 0.48 
 




 Source: Hyslop, Feb. 1999 
 
 
46.  The coefficients are for those taxpayers who have positive income in each of the 
years 1994 to 1997. 
 
47.  Over a three-year period the correlation coefficients are typically below 0.5. 
Although this is a low value and, on the face of it, implies that a large fraction 
of the observed differences in incomes is transitory, Hyslop notes that these 
results are susceptible to the presence of outliers. He defines ‘outliers’ as any 
individual with market income in any year less than 10 percent of their four-
year sample average income. Such individuals numbered about 5 percent of 
males and 7 percent of females.  Table 7 (derived from Hyslop’s tables 6A and 
6B) gives results corresponding to those in Table 6, but excluding these outliers.   52 
 
 
  Table 7.   Correlation Coefficients of Taxpayer incomes over time: 
             Using IRD 1994-97 data, individuals aged 20-65 
      Excluding  ‘outliers’ 
 
   Market  Income    Disposable  Income 
   1 yr  2 yrs  3 yrs      1 yr  2 yrs  3 yrs 
 
Males      0.80 0.72 0.66     0.78 0.69 0.62 
 
Females    0.82 0.74 0.68     0.78 0.68 0.60 
 
  Source: Hyslop, Feb. 1999 
 
 
48.   Correlation is significantly stronger when the ‘outliers’ are excluded, being now 
in excess of 0.60 over a three-year period, and more in line with results typically 
found in US and other overseas analyses using panel survey data. 
 
49.   Hyslop’s results above are of considerable interest. Unfortunately they cannot 
tell us, because we do not have corresponding results for earlier periods, 
whether income mobility has been increasing or not. 
 
50.   Creedy earlier made use of the same data-set (1997a, 1997b), for the three years 
1990/91 to 1992/93. His estimated equations show some regression towards the 
mean over time, so that “there is no systematic tendency for success to breed 
success or for failure to lead to further failure” (1997b, page 101), and a degree 
of negative serial correlation so that individuals do not move systematically up 
or down the distribution (page 117). His model undoubtedly over-simplifies 
reality, however. The IRD data-set provides information on age and gender, but 
not on any other individual characteristics. Creedy’s estimates are constrained 
by this data limitation, and cannot take account of the different potential income 
profiles for, say, different levels of educational qualification. His estimated 
‘regression to the mean’ parameter assumed that incomes for all individuals of a 
given age and gender regress towards the same mean, a clearly implausible 
assumption.  A tendency to regress to different means, determined for example 
by educational qualification, is far more probable, and would result in the 
persistence of permanent income differences over time.  
 
51.   The lack of detailed information on individual characteristics beyond age and 
gender is a major obstacle to using the IRD data-set for detailed longitudinal 
analyses. 
 
The Christchurch Health and Development Study (CHDS) 
 
52.   There are very few other longitudinal income data-sets available in 
New Zealand. One, however, is the data available from the CHDS. This study, 
initiated by Dr Fergusson, has tracked the development of 1,263 children born 
in Christchurch area hospitals between April and August of 1977. Interviews 
were held annually until the children reached age 18. Relatively consistent   53 
information on family income was collected during interviews when the 
children were between the ages of 1 and 14. 
 
53.   This information, anonymised, was made available to the Law and Economics 
Consulting Group, for analyses commissioned by Treasury. (Maloney and 
Barker, August 1999). The objective was to examine both spells and movements 
into and out of poverty by these families. The results given here are for those 
453 families who reported their incomes for each year from 1978 to 1991. This 
is out of 962 families who reported their income in the final year 1991. 
 
54.   Chart 19 shows median family pre-tax income over the period 1978 to 1991. 
(Deflator changed from that used in Maloney and Barker, to the Reserve Bank 
index excluding GST and interest costs.) Real median income increases steadily 
over the period. This should not, however, be interpreted as saying that median 
family incomes for New Zealand families in general were rising over this 
period. What is happening is that, as these families change from being ‘young’ 
to ‘middle-aged’ families, their income is increasing relative to that of the 
population in general. The income of the principal income earner tends to 
increase as he/she follows his/her career path, and also more of the families 
become ‘double income’ households. Chart 16 earlier shows the increase in 
average family income for more ‘mature’ households. It is that pattern that is 
being reproduced in Chart 19.  
 
 
55.  The next chart shows the changes in percentile boundaries for the same families. 
The dispersion of these boundaries appears initially fairly constant, but then 
seems to increase quite rapidly from 1985 to 1988, and after that more slowly. 
Too much should not be read into results from a relatively small sample, and it 
is conceivable that family incomes do in any case start to disperse more widely 
at a period some ten years on average after the birth of a child. Nevertheless, the 
 
Chart 19:  Median Real Gross Family Income in the CHDS 
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widening gap between top and bottom has a resemblance to that in the earlier 
Chart 7 for New Zealand households in general, although that chart showed 
decile means rather than boundaries.  
 
56.  Analyses of income mobility over all income levels have not yet been carried 
out for the data from this survey, though it is planned now to do this. Analyses 


























 Chart 20:  Percentile Boundaries for Real Equivalised Incomes in the CHDS 



























10th Percentile  55 
Summary:  Section B.2. Income Dynamics 
    (see also mid-section summary in para 30). 
 
Results from analyses of New Zealand tax data reported in Hyslop (February/March 
1999) are broadly in line with overseas evidence on the dynamics of individual 
incomes.  One conclusion is that there is a lot of period-to-period fluctuation in 
individual incomes. For example Hyslop’s transition matrices summarised above 
show that only 31 percent of males in the bottom income quintile in Year 1 might 
expect to be in that same quintile four years later. An estimated 42.5 percent of the 
original cohort will have moved into higher income quintiles (the remaining 27 
percent are ‘missing’ from the data-set, or reporting negative or zero income). Of 
those males in the top quintile in Year 1, an expected 56 percent will still be in the top 
income group 5 years later, but 36 percent will be found in one of quintiles 1 to 4  
(leaving 8 percent ‘missing’, etc.). The results for females are similar, with somewhat 
greater mobility out of the bottom and top quintiles.  
 
There is also, however, a significant degree of persistence in income differences over 
time.  Hyslop’s results suggest that between 40 and 60 percent of point-in-time 
income differences persist after 4 years, depending on whether outliers are included 
or excluded. These results are therefore quite sensitive to the treatment of potential 
outliers in the database.  
 
These are two important conclusions – that there exists substantial period-to-period 
volatility, but also that income differences show significant persistence over time. To 
some extent we can say more about the causes of this ‘persistence’ effect. Material 
elsewhere in this report shows that observable demographic and skill characteristics 
(e.g. age, education levels, gender) account for quite large differences in average 
income. These characteristics are to all intents and purposes “persistent”, and in 
general an individual’s income is in part determined by them (though always with 
some individuals found well above or well below the general average).  
 
The policy message to take from this is familiar, but well worth the restating. That is 
the need to ensure that everyone, but especially those in disadvantaged groups, is 
given access to opportunities to enhance their skill levels – both access to education 
and training, and opportunities to gain experience. 
 
Tax data analyses are constrained by there being available information only on age 
and gender, but not on other important income determinants, such as educational 
qualification, and skill levels and experience.  
 
It is difficult to make any comparison of tax-based estimates of income mobility with 
those cited for overseas countries. Those results are mostly based on household 
longitudinal survey data, and the data from such surveys, often using income concepts 
tailored more closely to policy interests, differs in many ways from tax return 
information.  
 
The Christchurch Health and Development Study (CHDS) is a valuable longitudinal 
data-set, collecting income data annually, for families with a child born in 1977, over 
a 14-year period. The results show the expected increase in median real income as 
families ‘mature’ and also a widening of their income distribution in the late 1980s, 
which could be a life cycle effect or could be connected to the general increase in 
income inequality at about that time.   56 
 
B.3  Income dynamics of those ‘at the bottom’. 
 
Analyses from the CHDS 
 
57.   ‘Static’ implications have been discussed earlier. In brief, the poor on the whole 
appear to have got poorer in real income terms in the last 15 years, by perhaps 
5 percent  on  average;  a  significant  reduction  in  living  standards.  Certain 
household types – particularly sole parent families - appear to make up a larger 
proportion of the ‘lowest income’ group than formerly; whereas the elderly have 
on the whole improved their position. 
 
58.   A previously untapped source for studying the dynamics of poverty in 
New Zealand is the CHDS– described above. Indeed there is no other source 
currently providing like data. The Maloney and Barker report on the CHDS data 
defined a ‘poverty threshold’ in terms of 50 or 60 percent of median equivalised 
incomes; and then ascertained how many families and children had fallen below 
this line, and whether transiently, or more frequently, or permanently.  
 
59.   Their preferred results are given below. The low-income threshold is defined 
there as 60 percent of median (from the CHDS itself) equivalised income in any 




Table 8: (Table 7 from Maloney and Barker) 
 
Temporal Patterns in Low-Income Spells for CHDS Children 
CHDS Median Income Threshold 
 
     Proportion  of  – 
   Children  Children  currently   Children  ever 
      P o o r      P o o r  
 
No  Poverty   0.545    -     - 
 
Transient  (once)   0.128    0.068     0.282 
 
Occasional  (not  >  1yr)    0.033    0.046     0.073 
 
Recurrent  (some  >  1yr)    0.183    0.569     0.403 
 
Persistent  (once,   0.091    0.188     0.199 
 for  2-13  yrs)    
 
Chronic  (repeat     0.015    0.097     0.034 
  spells, never separated by more than one year) 
 
Permanent   0.004    0.033     0.010 
  -  continuous 
 
 All   100%    100%     100% 
 
 
  Source: Maloney and Barker 
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60.  It can be seen from this table that 55 percent of children did not experience 
‘poverty’ during this 14-year period; and another 15 percent experienced 
poverty for just one year or only occasionally (with no occasion of duration 
longer than a year). At the other extreme, 0.4 percent experienced poverty 
continuously throughout the 14 years, and 1.5 percent experienced ‘chronic’ 
poverty, consisting of spells never separated by more than one year. Maloney 
and Barker state that at most one out of ten families was poor in ten or more 
years, and conclude that the evidence suggests that poverty is a transitory state 
for many of those families which experience it.  
 
61.   On a cross-sectional basis, larger percentages of those in poverty at a given 
point in time are there on a recurrent, persistent, chronic or permanent basis. 
 
62.    To some extent, but a relatively limited extent, a move into poverty was 
associated with a move from a two-parent to one-parent household, and moves 
out of poverty with the converse. Other relevant demographic and social factors 
are also analysed in the report. 
 
63.   The results are consistent with those reported in US studies cited by the authors 
of the report (though there is substantial sampling variability in the NZ results). 
  
64.    To sum up, most experience ‘poverty’ never or but briefly. But that small 
minority who do experience it more frequently, or even permanently, account 
for most of those in ‘poverty’ at any given point in time. 
 
Analyses from IRD data 
 
65.   In addition to his analyses of general income mobility, discussed above, Hyslop 
was also able to use the IRD data-set containing longitudinal information on 
individual incomes to carry out an econometric analysis of the ‘persistence 
effects’ of welfare benefit receipt on individuals’ income. (Hyslop, Aug. 1999) 
This was to test two competing hypotheses for the observed persistence ‘on 
welfare’ of those receiving welfare benefits – the ‘welfare trap’ hypothesis in 
which the receipt of welfare in itself increases the recipients’ propensity to 
receive welfare benefits in succeeding periods – or the ‘heterogeneity’ 
hypothesis according to which some members of the population have a greater 
propensity than others to require welfare, and soon come to dominate the 
population of welfare recipients.  
 
66.    Results for his initial specification supported the ‘welfare trap’ hypothesis. 
However, more elaborate specifications found “no systematic evidence of a 
positive or negative effect of benefit receipt on incomes.”  
 
67.   This is an important result for policy purposes. It implies that the optimal policy 
for helping those on welfare is not necessarily to try to move people off benefit 
as quickly as possible by whatever means are most effective. Hyslop, however, 
expressed some econometric caveats about these results. It is clearly desirable 
that further analyses be carried out.   58 
 
Overseas analyses of ‘poverty dynamics’ 
 
68.   In addition to the work cited by Maloney and Barker (Rebecca Blank, 1997, and 
Walker, 1994); the papers cited earlier on income mobility also in many cases 
focus specifically on the ‘lowest income’ group. The recent Economic Journal 
article by Gardiner and Hills discusses the issue in some detail for UK panel 
data sources. They argue persuasively against the belief that because of income 
mobility poverty is in general a fairly temporary phenomenon. 
 
69.   To quote (much based on data from the British Household Panel Survey) – 
 
“ while there is considerable income mobility, most of it is short-range.” 
(p. F96) 
 “ … the escape rates of those who stay at the bottom for more than one period 
seem to decline. Either people get stuck and find it increasingly hard to escape, 
or there are two different populations: ‘bouncers’ and ‘stickers’…” (p. F96)   
“Low income is not a random phenomenon.” (p. F96) 
 
70.   More generally those who escape upwards from the lower income bracket have 
a  greater propensity to fall back into it later than do those originally in the 
upper bracket (trajectories depicted on page F101 of op. cit.). 
 
71.   The paper’s concluding section is worth quoting at some length. 
 
“It is important to distinguish between at least three groups: the persistently 
poor, the recurrently poor and the temporarily poor. …..  Much current 
government policy ….  is aimed at getting people who are currently out of work 
into work. The extent of recurrent poverty …  suggests that policy needs to pay 
attention not just to the first transition, off benefit and into work. It also needs to 
focus on subsequent transitions, stopping the same people simply cycling 
between benefits and work, much of it low paid. Finally, 40% of low income 
observations are accounted for by people who are not only poor, but whose 
position in the income distribution does not change significantly over a four 
year period. For many of these – disproportionately low income pensioners and 
lone parents and their children – it is the level of social security benefits which 
will have the greatest effect on their standard of living.” (p. F110)   59 
 
 
Summary:  Income dynamics of those ‘at the bottom’ 
 
Longitudinal studies are essential for examining the duration of ‘poverty’. Maloney 
and Barker’s results from the Christchurch Health and Development Study, which are 
consistent with overseas work, show that a minority of families with children, though 
quite a substantial minority, do experience occasional ‘relative poverty’. For most of 
these, however, the experience is short-lived and once-off. A small minority do 
experience poverty for longer periods or recurrently. These account for most of those 
families ‘in poverty’ at any given point in time.  
 
Overseas panel studies suggest strongly that being in the state of ‘poverty’ at a given 
point in time is positively linked with having been in poverty in previous periods. For 
New Zealand, Hyslop’s recent study of ‘welfare dependence’ suggests on the whole, 
although confirmation by further work would be desirable, that the persistence of 
some people ‘on welfare’ is a consequence not of their initial receipt of welfare, but of 
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B.4 Income  Volatility 
 
The ‘Increased Mobility’ hypothesis  
 
72.   New Zealand is not the only country which has seen increases in cross-sectional 
income inequality in recent years. (Statistics NZ, 1999, Chapter 7; and also 
Chart 4 earlier in this report.)  A question which has been debated is whether 
this cross-sectional inequality increase is the result of an increase in income 
volatility or mobility, rather than a genuine increase in inequality. 
 
73.   The argument runs as follows. Suppose each individual (or household) has an 
expected ‘permanent’ income. This permanent income would be determined by 
such factors as age, work experience, qualifications, and other factors. In 
addition suppose there is a variable or ‘transitory’ component of income which 
varies randomly from period to period.  
 
74.   Suppose now that the transitory component increases relative to the size of the 
permanent component, for all persons or households. Income mobility, or 
volatility, would increase. People would move from period to period up and 
down over a wider income range than before. 
 
75.   The effect would be to ‘flatten out’ the income distribution, and to increase 
cross-sectional income inequality. In other words precisely the changes that 
have been seen in New Zealand and some other countries. 
 
76.   The point is that the apparent increase in inequality would not be a genuine 
increase, at least in the longer term. If incomes were to be added over a number 
of years, the random inter-period ups and downs would tend to cancel out, and 
the relatively unchanged ‘underlying’ distribution would reappear. 
 
77.   Of course this is a very simple model of the way in which inter-period changes 
in income are generated. The true picture is undoubtedly more complicated. 
Nevertheless the same general conclusion could be expected – a general 
increase in income mobility, for whatever reason, will lead to an apparent 
increase in income inequality, but the increase will be a ‘statistical artefact’ 
which gradually vanishes as incomes are aggregated over longer periods.
4 
 
78.   The question is whether income mobility can be shown to have increased, or not 
to have increased. Unfortunately the material available on period-to-period 
mobility, derived by Creedy (1997a&b) and by Hyslop (1999) from tax data and 
discussed above, does not allow consistent comparisons over a sufficiently long 
                                                 
4   Note, however, that Creedy (1997b, Chapter 6) rejects this argument. He attacks a version of it in 
an OECD report (1996), pointing out that the precise effects of an increase in relative mobility on 
cross-sectional and life-time inequality depend on the age distribution and also the age-earnings 
profiles. He is able to construct counter-examples, in which increased mobility increases lifetime 
inequality more than it does cross-sectional inequality, though these seem to require rather unusual 
age distributions. In another counter-example, this time with ‘regression towards the mean’, an 
increase in mobility will decrease life-time inequality. At the least, Creedy’s comments illustrate 
the care needed in specifying generating models for income distributions.   61 
period to answer this question. There is some ‘indirect’ New Zealand evidence, 
which is discussed below, followed by a brief review of the international 
literature. 
 
79.   A point worth making here is that an increase in income mobility in itself has 
costs and benefits. The more risk-averse will see increased mobility as meaning 
increased insecurity and stress; ambitious risk-seekers will see it as potential 
gain. 
 
‘Indirect’ New Zealand evidence on changes in mobility 
 
80.   A possible clue to whether or not income mobility has increased is to examine 
whether the rate of transition into and out of ‘Earning’ (employment and self-
employment) has been increasing. Chart 21 uses data from the Household 
Labour Force Survey (HLFS) on quarterly transition rates, supplied by the 
Labour Market Policy group. Exit rates are a proportion of those in earnings, 
and entry rates a proportion of those unemployed or not in employment. The 






81.   There is no visually apparent increase in ‘turnover’, including the period most 
of interest, from 1986 to 1990. 
 
82.    This suggests that there has been no significant increase in employment 
mobility, which might be expected to account for at least part of any increase in 
income mobility. It does not, of course, necessarily follow that income mobility 
did not increase. An increase in income mobility could still occur independently 
of changes in employment mobility.  
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83.   It has been argued that consumption is based on ‘permanent’ income, excluding 
‘transitory’ income, and that it follows that an increase in income volatility will 
not lead to an equivalent increase in consumption volatility. If correct, and 
income volatility has increased, this would imply that consumption inequality 
should not have increased in the way that income inequality has. 
 
84.   Gini coefficients have been calculated for household expenditure by John Scott 
of Statistics NZ. The chart below compares the income and expenditure Gini 
coefficients. The increase in the expenditure coefficients is less than that of the 






Overseas research on income mobility 
 
85.   There is a burgeoning literature on ‘income mobility’, using data from the panel 
surveys which are becoming increasingly common. A number of these have 
investigated in detail whether changes in income inequality can be associated 
with changes in income mobility.  
 
86.   Useful papers, in general highly technical, include Atkinson et. al. (1988), Jarvis 
and Jenkins (1998), Baker and Solon (1999), Gottschalk and Danziger (1997), 
Burkhauser and Poupore (1997). Gittleman and Joyce (1995), and Gardiner and 
Hills (1999) will be easier going for most readers. Most of the papers have been 
written in an environment in which income or earnings inequality has been 
increasing (USA, UK, Canada). 
 
 
 Chart 22:  Expenditure and income Gini coefficients. 1985/86 to 1995/96.  









1985/86  1990/91  1995/96 
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87.   The general conclusion, at least of those papers written in the last few years, is 
that income mobility has not been increasing, or where it has, it is not the sole 
explanation for increased inequality.  
 
 
Section Summary and Conclusions.    Income Volatility. 
 
If income volatility has increased, this could help explain the increase in cross-
sectional income inequality in New Zealand. Unfortunately it is not possible with 
currently available incomes data to say whether or not New Zealand’s income 
mobility has increased. Some ‘indirect’ evidence is, however, available. ‘Employment 
mobility’, in the sense of ‘entry’ and ‘exit’ rates to and from employment, which might 
be expected to have some association with income mobility, does not appear (visually) 
to have changed significantly. Inequality of expenditure has also increased quite 
substantially, which is an argument that ‘permanent income’ inequality has 
increased, rather than just income mobility, on the assumption that households try to 
relate expenditure to ‘permanent’ income. On the other hand, expenditure inequality 
did not increase quite as much as income inequality, which could be an argument for 
some of the apparent increase in cross-sectional income inequality being a result of 
increased mobility. 
 
Overseas analyses, for countries which have also experienced increased income or 
earnings inequality, on the whole conclude that increased mobility is not the cause. 
 
These findings do show the potential importance of dynamics for understanding 
change in income inequality. Our current understanding is limited by the data. This 
emphasises the importance of developing longitudinal panel surveys to monitor 
income change in New Zealand. For instance, we want to know more about how 
people are adjusting to job losses and other shocks, for instance by retraining. There 
is a real paucity of information with which to answer these questions, because of the 
lack of large scale surveys that follow people through life. Yet these issues are central 
to analysing the effect of policy change on welfare outcomes in New Zealand. 
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Part C:  Contributors To The Change In Cross-Sectional Income 
Inequality 
 
C.1  Classifying The Contributors To Change 
 
1.  Having earlier confirmed the increase in inequality we now wish to explain it. A 
first level of analysis can be labelled as ‘decomposition’ analysis. This explains 
as much of the total change in inequality as possible by, first, identifying how 
much of the change is caused by changes in the relative size of different 
population sub-groups, and, second, how much is caused by changes in the 
relative average incomes of each of those different population size-groups. 
These sub-populations are defined in terms of their ‘attributes’; for example, 
age, level of educational qualification, labour force participation, household 
type. So we are talking about explaining as much as is possible of the change in 
inequality first in terms of changes in population attributes, and secondly in 
terms of changes in returns to those attributes.  
 
2.  At a later stage one might wish to go beyond ‘decomposition analysis’, trying to 
explain the changes in the sizes and average incomes of the different population 
sub-groups as outcomes of changes in the economic and social environment, 
either policy-caused or exogenous. 
 
3.   Concentrating initially on ‘decomposition’ analysis, the usual approach is to try 
to source as much of possible of the overall change in inequality, for a given 
type of income, to the following components – 
 
-  Changes in observable population attributes. For example changes in age 
structure for individuals, in the proportion of different household types for 
families or households, in levels of educational qualification, in skills, and 
in extent of participation in the paid workforce. For convenience attributes 
might be further sub-divided into – 
 
-  ‘Demographic’ attributes; e.g. age and sex for individuals, size and 
type of household for households. These are not much influenced by 
changes in the economic environment. 
-  ‘Economic’ attributes; e.g. skills and qualifications, degree of 
workforce participation. These are more strongly influenced by 
changes in the economic environment. 
 
-  Changes in returns to observable attributes. For example to levels of 
educational qualification. 
 
4.   This then leaves (usually) the  
 
-  Unexplained ‘residual’. This could be a result of not specifying all the 
relevant attributes. A part of the residual, however, is likely to be because 
even for individuals or households with identical attributes, observed and 
unobserved, the income distribution has changed, becoming either more 
dispersed or less dispersed.    66 
 
5.   This approach has been quite widely used (see Borland, 1999 for discussion; 
and Borland, 1998, and Dixon, 1998 for examples of application of the 
approach). It is sometimes known as the JMP method, after Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce (1993).  
 
6.   The chart below illustrates first the build-up of the distribution of individuals’ 
wage and salary incomes in this framework, then the combination of wages and 
salaries with other types of income, and finally the combination of individual 
incomes to household incomes and the combination of different household 
types. This gives the distribution at a given point in time. Changes over time are 
the net outcome of changes in all the separate components. 
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7.   There  is  more  than  one  way  of  carrying  out  a  ‘decomposition  analysis’  in 
practice. One approach is to calculate the effect of holding some attribute 
constant. This was done for example by Statistics NZ (1999) to analyse the 
effect of changes in the proportions of different household types. (See 
‘Demographic Adjustment’ row in earlier Table 2.) Also, on a more extensive 
basis, by Hyslop and Maré (1999), calculating the effect of holding constant 
various combinations of both attributes and returns to attributes (discussed 
further below). 
 
8.   Another approach is, having classified the population into sub-groups, by some 
attribute or attributes (gender, labour force status, age, etc.), to then calculate the 
effect on inequality over time of “between-group” changes  - that is the effect of 
changes in relative numbers and mean incomes of the groups. The remaining 
unexplained change in inequality can then be labelled as “within-group” 
inequality change.  
 
9.   This second approach is particularly appropriate where we do not have data on 
individual persons and households. This is the case for census incomes data 
where we have numbers with specific attributes in a given income range. The 
separation of change into “between-group” and “within-group” requires a 
measure of inequality mathematically suitable for this kind of decomposition. 
The Gini coefficient is not amenable to this approach. For this reason in his 
work on census income inequality Martin (1998a) used the ‘mean logarithmic 
deviation’ (MLD), which is amenable. Technical discussions of the MLD are to 
be found in Martin (1998a, pages 60-68) and Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1992). 
For other technical discussions of ‘decomposition’ see for example Shorrocks 
(1980) and Jenkins (1995). 
 
10.   The sections that follow report first on ‘decomposition analyses’ for individuals; 
then the combining of individual incomes to give family and household 
incomes; and then the results of ‘decomposition analyses’ for households. A 





‘Decomposition analysis’ seeks to explain the overall change in inequality in terms of 
changes in population attributes, for individuals and households, and changes in the 
average income return to those attributes. This still leaves, usually, an ‘unexplained’ 
component of the total change in inequality. This can be caused by measurement 
error, failure to specify all relevant attributes, or a broadening or narrowing of the 
income distribution for those whose attributes are otherwise identical. 
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C.2  Contributors to the increase in Individuals’ Income Inequality 
 
11.   The two charts in the Statistical Appendix of the distribution of males’ and 
females’ market incomes show the same change between 1986 and 1991 as 
found by Hyslop and Maré for household incomes from 1983-86 to 1995-98 
(earlier Chart 3). Namely a flattening of the distribution and increased 
dispersion. 
 
Contributions measured using census incomes data 
 
12.    Martin (1998a) found that, for those employed, shifts in the structure or 
composition of the labour force accounted for a little under 40 percent of the 
increase in income inequality from 1986 to 1996. Another 20 percent 
approximately was due to a widening in income differentials by occupation, 
education, industry and age. This left about 40 percent of the total increase in 
income inequality unexplained. 
 
Change in individual income inequality, using HES data 
 
13.   The table below from the Statistics NZ 1999 report (Figure 3.18) gives Gini 
coefficients for all persons 15 and over. Results are given for the three main 
income measures. The same pattern is seen as for household income inequality 
– a decline to 1986, a steep increase between 1986 and 1991, and a further 
though smaller increase to 1996 (although for market income there is no further 
increase). A further table in the Statistics NZ report (Figure 2.20), not given 
here, shows that if the calculation for Market Income is restricted to those 
actually receiving some market income the Gini coefficient continued to 
increase in the latest period also.  
 
 











  (Figure 3.18 in Statistics NZ, 1999)
Distribution of Personal Income: Gini Coefficients, 1982-1996
Type of income 1982 1986 1991 1996
Gini coefficient
Market income 0.566 0.542 0.611 0.609
Gross income 0.472 0.437 0.474 0.495
Disposable income 0.414 0.386 0.437 0.456





14.   The next table examines the wages and salaries component of market income, 
for those actually receiving some wage and salary income during the year. The 
same pattern over time is apparent. There are gender differences, however. The 
increase in inequality since 1986 has been much smaller for females than for 
males (although female inequality is higher than male inequality, because of the 





15.   These changes are associated with marked shifts in labour force participation. 
The chart below gives participation rates by sex for the adult population since 
1987. Up to that date, participation rates had been relatively stable for males, 
falling from 79.3 percent at the 1981 census to 77.5 percent at the 1986 census; 
and rising for females, from 47.2 percent in 1981 to 53.3 percent in 1986. 
 
16.    From 1987, however, male participation fell precipitously, not beginning to 
increase again until 1993. Participation in 1987 was 78.6 percent; in 1993 just 
 
Chart 24:  Changes in Individuals' Income Inequality 1982-96.  













 Table 10:  Gini Coefficients: Wages and Salaries by sex 
Wage and salary earners 15-64 
1982  1986  1991  1996 
Gini coefficient 
Males  0.340  0.339 0.408  0.434 
Females  0.479  0.459  0.481 0.486 
All 0.427  0.421 0.466  0.479 
Source:  Statistics NZ (1999) Figures 2.10 and 2.11   71 
73 percent. (Unemployed are counted as labour force participants – if excluded, 
the ‘employment participation’ trend would fall even more starkly.) Female 
participation also fell, reversing the long established upwards trend, although 
falling by less than male participation, and bottoming out in 1990. Participation 





17.   Some of this fall in participation reflects a rise in attendance at post-compulsory 
educational institutions (itself partly a response to job-finding becoming more 
difficult). Labour force participation fell between 1987 and 1997, however, for 
males in every age-group except those aged 60-64. For females participation fell 
only for the two youngest age-groups 15-19, and 20-24, and the 40-44 age-
group. Across a wide range of male age-groups, from 20 to 45, there was little 
or no indication of an upturn in participation even by 1997. Although for male 
age-groups from 25 to 54 participation in 1997 still exceeds 90 percent, there is 
some support in these global numbers for the ‘Marginal Men’ hypothesis, the 
existence of a growing underclass of men “whose lack of economic resources is 
sentencing them to life as outsiders.”  (Quoted in Callister, 1999. See also 
Dixon (1999), who examines these trends in detail using 1997 HLFS data. Age, 
qualifications, ethnicity, having no partner, and being a sole parent all have a 
statistically significant association with non-participation.) 
 
 
Contributors to changes in wages and salaries income inequality 
 
18.   Wages and salaries make up approximately 80 percent of all personal market 
income, with self-employment income accounting for another 10 to 12 percent; 
most of the remainder being investment income (Statistics NZ, 1999. 
Figure  2.12). Changes in inequality of wages and salaries can be expected 
therefore to be the dominant factor in changes in market income inequality. 
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19.   Sylvia Dixon has published a series of papers on the distribution of earnings in 
the New Zealand labour market (Dixon, 1995, 1996, and 1998). The 1995 paper 
looks at changes in the dispersion of industry average wages; and the later two 
at the distribution of earnings and the growth in the dispersion of earnings. 
These last two papers, making use of HES data, differ from other studies in that 
they analyse weekly and hourly earnings rather than annual earnings. This 
means that one possible source of the growth in inequality – an increased 
variation in the number of weeks worked per year – can be put aside. The focus 
is more on the causes of earnings variation than on changes in employment 
stability. 
 
20.   She found in her 1998 paper that, over the period 1984 to 1997, median hourly 
earnings grew only slightly in real terms. Median weekly earnings of full-time 
employees increased by around 10 percent however. Mean weekly hours 
worked by full-time males increased across the income spectrum, but more so 
for high-earners (Dixon reviews possible causes of measurement error in the 
data on hours worked). 
 
21.    Using a number of measures of inequality she found that the increases in 
weekly earnings dispersion over the period were substantially larger than the 
increases in hourly earnings dispersion (more especially in the 1990 to 1997 
period). The increases in inequality were most rapid between 1986 and 1990, 
and from 1995 to 1997.  
 
22.   At least part of the increased inequality of weekly earnings could be attributed 
therefore to changes in the distribution of hours worked. 
 
23.    Examining earnings differentials associated with skill-related characteristics, 
Dixon found that only a few were moving consistently in a direction likely to 
cause increased inequality. “ .. education and age differentials did not widen 
much over the 13-year period of the study, and gender differences narrowed.” 
(Dixon, 1998, page 94).  
 
  Using the JMP decomposition analysis referred to earlier, the results in the 




Decomposition of change in full-time weekly earnings
(sd of log earnings) 1984 to 1997
Change in - Contribution
Total Observed Returns to  Unobserved of unobserved
change charact- Observed fac tors factors
  -eristics charact-
  -eristics
Males 0.129 0.012 0.025 0.091 70.8%
Females 0.099 0.027 0.000 0.073 73.3%
Source: Dixon (1998), Table 7, page 96  73 
 
24.   That is, on this measure about 25 to 30 percent of increased weekly earnings 
inequality was explainable in terms of changes in observable characteristics and 
returns to those characteristics. The remainder was ‘unexplained’. (For 
alternative percentile ratio measures a higher proportion was explained, up to 
about 50 percent, more particularly for males.) Her analyses did not include 
occupation or industry, which might partly explain why the proportion 
‘unexplained’ was higher than the 40 percent ‘unexplained’ found by Martin in 
his analyses of census data on incomes of employed persons. There are other 
differences in their data, for example Dixon’s data being full-time weekly 
earnings, versus Martin’s being annual incomes. 
 
25.   Dixon reached the following conclusions  (op. cit. page 101)– 
 
“Changes in earnings differentials associated with measured skill-related 
characteristics, such as formal qualifications, age and potential years of work 
experience, made a positive net contribution to the total rise in earnings 
inequality, particularly during the 1980s. Overall however, that contribution was 
relatively small.” 
 
“The largest share of the growth in earnings inequality between 1984 and 1997 
occurred within the main demographic and skill groups. This raises some 
interesting questions about the underlying drivers of the growth in inequality. 
 
The evidence that earnings inequality was rising before 1991, and did not 
noticeably pick up in pace after 1991, does not provide immediate support for 
the notion that the Employment Contracts Act 1991 made a fundamental 
difference to the growth of earnings inequality in New Zealand.” 
 
26.    Her conclusions, for individuals’ earnings, are similar to the provisional 
conclusions reached by Hyslop and Maré, for gross household incomes, in their 
work (discussed further below). 
 
Differences in source of personal market income 
 
27.   Sources of income other than wages and salaries are more unequally distributed, 
at least among households, than wages and salaries. The ‘concentration 
coefficient’ (for an income component the equivalent of the Gini coefficient) for 
wages and salaries in 1995/96 was 0.409, having risen from 0.335 in 1985/86. 
(Statistical Appendix Table 5, but note these measures are for households rather 
than individuals.) That for self-employment income in 1995/96 was 0.703 
(0.489 in 1985/86) and for investment income in 1995/96 was 0.510 (0.556 in 
1985/86).  
 
28.   The chart below, from census data analyses in Bururu et. al., illustrates how 
self-employment income is more widely dispersed across the income range than 
wages and salaries. Both the self-employed and wage and salary earners have 
their highest concentrations in the $30,000-40,000 income range; but the self-
employed distribution is much flatter, with higher proportions in the top income 
brackets, but also amongst those making losses.   74 
 
 
Returns to Educational Qualifications 
 
29.    In a recent major project, Maani (1997; 1999) has been analysing income 
returns to educational qualifications, using census data. She found (1997) that 
returns to education in New Zealand are comparable to those in other high 
income countries. Also that there were significant increases in returns to tertiary 
education over the 1981-1991 decade. Tertiary participation rates increased 
significantly during this period and have continued to increase. 
 
30.   For the latest period, 1991 to 1996, the significant change is that the private 
returns to a Bachelor’s degree have stabilised for males, and fallen slightly for 
females. The fall in the returns from tertiary qualifications to females became 
more apparent after adjustment for the greater significance of immigrant 
numbers with higher education since 1991. To quote – 
 
“Of course, the income gains to tertiary education may not be expected to 
increase indefinitely, especially with supply adjustments, and the 1996 evidence 
indicates that a stabilisation of the market for graduates has been in effect in the 
1991-1996 period.” (Maani, 1999, page 34) 
 
31.   Maani’s overall results, however, confirm that returns to all educational levels 
were significantly higher in 1996 than in 1981. It would be expected that this 
would be associated with an increase in income inequality. Dixon did find that 
the penalty for ‘no qualifications’ had grown larger (Dixon, 1998, page 91) but 
that the premia for higher qualifications had tended to decline in the 1990s. She 
considered that this could be a cohort-specific effect, due to the large increase in 
the supply of those with university qualifications. In general neither Dixon’s 
results, nor Hyslop and Maré’s for household income, show changes in 
 
 Chart 26:  Distribution of Wage & Salary earners, and self-employed  




































% Wages & Salaries 
 % Self-employed   75 
educational qualifications and in returns to those qualifications making a major 
contribution to increased inequality, relative to other contributors. 
  
 
Section summary: Contributors to changes in Individuals’ income inequality 
 
The trends in individual income inequality are similar to those already seen in 
household or family income inequality. Inequality rose significantly in the late 1980s, 
and has generally continued to do so in the 1990s, at a slower rate. The rise in the 
1980s was associated with a general fall in labour force participation, particularly 
for males; but the increase in participation since the early 1990s has not been 
accompanied by a fall in inequality. Male participation is still significantly lower than 
in the early 1980s, which supports the argument that the number of so-called 
’Marginal Men’ has increased. 
 
Some 60 percent of the increase in census income inequality, for employed persons, 
between 1986 and 1996 can be explained by shifts in the composition of the labour 
force, and by a widening of income differentials for observable characteristics. 
(Martin, 1998a) 
 
Wages and salaries are by far the largest component of personal market income. 
Dixon has examined growth in wages and salaries inequality in detail. Weekly wages 
and salaries inequality has increased more than hourly wages and salaries inequality, 
because average hours worked, which have increased generally for full-time workers, 
have increased more for those on higher incomes. Changes in observed workforce 
characteristics, and in returns to those characteristics, were found to explain some of 
the increase in weekly earnings inequality, but at least a half and perhaps around two 
thirds, of the increase in inequality, as measured in the Household Economic Survey,  
remains unexplained. 
 
Returns to educational qualifications over the last two decades have increased, as 
shown by Maani, except that in the latest inter-censal period returns to males for a 
Bachelor’s degree have stabilised, and for females fallen. From the work of both 
Dixon for individual wage and salary earners, and Hyslop and Maré for households, 
changes in educational qualifications and in the returns to qualifications , do not 
seem to have made much contribution to increased inequality.  
 
 
C.3  From individuals to households 
 
32.   Increases in individuals’ income inequality and increases in household income 
inequality are of course linked. The charts below from Martin (1998a) show this 
clearly, although the charts are for ‘families’ rather than households. The first 
chart is for all labour force statuses; the second for ‘Employed’ men and 
‘Employed’ families. 





33.   The question is whether the process of aggregation of individual incomes to the 
family or household level has added to, or reduced, the upwards trend in income 
inequality. Of particular interest is the effect of an increasing proportion over 
time of ‘double income’ households. 
 
34.   The proportion of couple households which are ‘double income’ has increased 
steadily over the years, except for the 1986 to 1991 period. There have been 
several overseas studies looking at whether this general trend has increased 
 
Chart 27:  Census Income Inequality trends 1976-96 - Comparison of Families and Men  

















Chart 28:  Changes in Census Income Inequality 1976-96. Comparing 'Employed' families and 'Employed'  
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household income inequality or the reverse. The conventional wisdom has been 
that on the whole it has reduced income inequality, with wives’ income 
contributions counting more in the lower and middle parts of the income 
distribution. Some of the most recent overseas studies (Burtless,1999; Jantti, 
1997), however, do find that increased proportions of double income 
households have increased inequality. But another (Harkness, et. al., 1996) finds 
the reverse for the UK. 
 
35.   In general couple formation is highly assortative – people seek partners with 
similar educational qualifications (see Callister on the “Meet market”; 1998b). 
 
36.   Chart 29 draws on unpublished analyses using Statistics NZ HES data-sets. The 
‘couple’ data-set used included only two-adult households of opposite sex, with 
or without children. These numbered about half of all households. The chart 
shows the contribution of the double-income households to the overall income 





37.   The ‘double-income’ contribution increases steadily with household income. It 
is impossible to determine visually, however, whether the charted changes over 
the 1985/96 to 1995/96 period are such as to increase inequality. 
 
38.   The causes can be analysed arithmetically, however, in the same manner as in 
the Hyslop and Maré’s work. The coefficient of variation of the couple income 
distribution (using the decile data) was 0.6 in 1986 (and also earlier in 1982). It 
increased to around 0.8 in 1991 and 1996. 
 
39.   If the proportions in each decile of ‘neither with income’,  ‘one with income’ 
and ‘double income’, are fixed at the 1996 proportions, the coefficient of 
variation in 1986 becomes 0.66. That is about one quarter to one third of the 
 
Chart 29:  Contribution of "two-income" couple households to total 'couple' household income.  
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increase in inequality (0.06 as a proportion of 0.20) is explainable by changes in 
the relative proportions. Fixing the relative ‘returns’ at their 1996 ratios, 
however, does not explain any of the increased inequality. 
 
40.   In summary, changes in ‘double income’ proportions, together with changes in 
other proportions, including ‘neither with income’, do explain a part of the 
increase in income inequality; perhaps about 30 percent for that approximate 
half of all households which are ‘couple’ households. 
 
 
Section Summary: From Individuals to Households 
 
The process of aggregating individual incomes to family or household level could 
either increase or decrease trends in inequality over time. Both outcomes have been 
reported in the international literature. 
 
An initial analysis of New Zealand ‘couple’ households suggests that changes in the 
proportions of different kinds of ‘couple’ households (‘neither with income’, ‘one 
income’, ‘double income’) have made a contribution to the increase in household 
income inequality, perhaps of the order of 15 percent. Changes in ‘returns’ to these 





C.4  Contributors To The Increase In Household Income Inequality 
 
Analyses in terms of household attributes, and returns to attributes 
 
41.    The four major recent New Zealand studies of household or family income 
distribution (Hyslop and Maré, 1999; Statistics NZ, 1999; Podder and 
Chatterjee, 1998; and Martin, 1998) all in one way or another attempted a 
‘decomposition’ analysis, though with differences in approach, and sometimes 
focussing on different explanatory variables. 
 
42.    Detailed results from Hyslop and Maré are given first. The results of other 
studies are then given, checking how well they corroborate the Hyslop and Maré 
analyses. Hyslop and Maré endeavour to explain the increase in inequality of 
Gross Household income from 1983-86 to 1995-98 in terms of the following 
causes – 
 
-  changes in the proportion of different household types and in the income 
distribution for each separate household type  
-  changes in such attributes as age, educational qualification 
-  changes in one particularly important attribute, employment status 
-  changes in the ‘returns’ to each of these attributes 
 
43.   Six different household types are defined by Hyslop and Maré. Charts 30 and 31  
(figures 2.2a and 2.2b from their work) show visually their respective 
contributions to the overall distribution in 1983-86 and 1995-98.   79 
 
 
Chart 30:  Distribution of Household Gross Incomes, 1983-86:  
  Contributions by Household Type 
 
 
Chart 31:  Distribution of Household Gross Incomes, 1995-98:  
  Contributions by Household Type 
 
 
44.   It is immediately apparent that part of the change between 1983-86 and 1995-98 
is associated with changes in the distribution for ‘Multiple with kids’ 
households. Their overall share fell. This in itself made the overall distribution 
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flatter because of the concentration of incomes for this household type at the 
‘modal’ income range of the overall income distribution. In addition, the 
distribution for this household type has become more spread out, again 
contributing to the flattening in the distribution for all households. 
 
45.   The effect for other household types is less clear-cut – though the “Multiple 
<60” households also appear to have become more dispersed. Other effects 
include increased contributions at the lower end of the income distribution from 
“Single over 60” and “Single with children” households.  
 
46.   Hyslop and Maré examined the effect of changing household proportions and 
the other potential causes sequentially, at each step constraining the earlier 
1983-86 distribution to the 1995-98 values of the chosen variable, and seeing 
whether this helped explain the difference between the two distributions. Thus 
first, the 1983-85 household type proportions were adjusted to 1995-98 
proportions. Then, in addition, income functions for given attributes estimated 
from the later years’ data were applied to 1983-86, and so on. Table 12 
decomposes the overall changes in the earlier table 1. It shows the amount by 
which each step, in the given sequence, brought the 1983-86 measure closer 




 Table 12  Sources of Change in Inequality – 1983-86 to 1995-98 
Gross Household Income 
 
     
 
 
Table  Sources of change in inequality - 1983-86 to 1995-98
Gross Household Income
Hyslop & Mare, 1999
Sources of change
Measure Hh Types Attributes EmploymenReturns Unexplained Total
Gini coefficient 0.0048 0.0136 0.0042 -0.0043 0.0331 0.0515
SD (log income) 0.0045 0.0395 -0.0010 -0.0136 0.0347 0.0640
Inter-Quartile Range 0.0321 0.0660 0.0017 -0.0178 0.0595 0.1415
%age contribution to overall change
Hh Types Attributes EmploymenReturns Unexplained Total
Gini coefficient 9.4% 26.4% 8.3% -8.3% 64.2% 100.0%
SD (log income) 7.0% 61.7% -1.6% -21.3% 54.2% 100.0%
Inter-Quartile Range 22.7% 46.6% 1.2% -12.6% 42.1% 100.0%
Source: Hyslop and Mare Table 4b.  81 
 
47.   The results vary rather with measure chosen. It can be said that – 
 
-  changes in household types do explain some of the increase in inequality, 
from about 10 to nearly 25 percent, depending on the chosen measure of 
inequality 
-  changes in attributes do explain an appreciable part of the increase, 
25 percent for the Gini coefficient, and substantially more for the other 
tabulated measures 
-  the contributions of employment changes, and of changes in ‘returns to 
attributes’ appear to be either insignificant or negative 
-  a good part of the increase in inequality is “unexplained”. It can be said, 
however, that over a third of the increase in the Gini coefficient has been 
explained, and nearly half that in the SD of log incomes. An appreciable 
amount of the increased inequality has therefore been ‘explained’ by 
observable changes in the determinants. 
 
48.  Surprisingly, job losses during the 1980s had little effect on most overall 
measures of income inequality.  Employment losses were experienced across 
the whole of the distribution.  They had the effect of compressing the bottom 
half of the distribution and, by dragging down the median, increasing inequality 
in the top half of the distribution.  These two effects largely offset each other, 
thus having little effect on the overall measure of inequality. 
 
49.   To label much of the change as “unexplained” means that it is unexplained by 
the factors so far investigated, in the form in which they have been investigated. 
For example it could be because of complex interactions between different 
factors, which are not identified by this approach. It could also be related to 
other yet untested factors, or else be because the increase in income dispersion 
was general, across all household types, demographic attributes, etc. 
 
50.   Chart 32 shows how much of the overall difference between the 1983-86 and 
1995-98 distributions is ‘explainable’ in terms of the sources of change listed in 
table 12. The overall distributions for 1983-86 and 1995-98 are shown. The 
additional ‘Adjusted 1983-6’ distribution then shows the effect of adjusting the 
initial distribution for the known changes which occurred in the intervening 
period; in household type proportions, attributes, employment, and returns to 
attributes and employment. Over much of the distribution the effect is to close 
the gap between the two distributions by a quite significant amount.  This is 
particularly the case over much of the range of household incomes from 
$18,000 to $70,000 household income in which most households are found. 
Although a substantial amount of the change in the distribution of household 
income during the 1980s and 1990s is still “unexplained”, Hyslop and Maré’s  
analysis suggests that the changing nature of families, and demographic 
attributes played an appreciable role in the observed changes. 
 
 
   82 
 
Analyses in terms of Income sources  
 
51.   Another approach to analysing the causes of the increase in income inequality is 
to look at the different sources of income. This line of research is not followed 
in the Hyslop and Maré analyses. However, Podder and Chatterjee developed an 
analytical approach in their 1998 paper for attributing the overall change in Gini 
coefficient to the different income sources. The contribution of each income 
source depends, first, on its overall ‘share’ in the income total, and how much 
this share changes; and secondly on the inequality of the distribution of that 
particular type of income, and how much that has changed over time. These are 
labelled the “share” and “concentration” components respectively. 
 
52.   Podder and Chatterjee’s analysis was for Gross income, equivalised on their 
own equivalence scale (0.8 for each additional adult, 0.4 for each additional 
child). Statistics NZ extended the Podder and Chatterjee analysis to Household 
Disposable income (equivalised using the Revised Jensen Scale). Results of 
both analyses are given in Table 13.  
 
53.    Some of the statistical calculations underlying the Statistics NZ analysis are 
given in Statistical Appendix Table 5 (reproducing a table from the Statistics 
NZ web-site). The table gives the share and concentration coefficients for each 
income source – these are referred to at various points in the next few 
paragraphs – and the share and concentration components of the overall increase 





  Chart 32: Distribution of Household Incomes. 
 'Explained' contribution to shift from 1983-86 to 1995-98 
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54.   There are differences in detail between the two analyses – in part no doubt due 
to differing time-periods and different income concepts (for example tax credits 
were included in Government Cash Benefits by Podder and Chatterjee, but as a 
negative direct tax in the Statistics NZ analysis). Both show, however, a 
significant contribution to the increase in inequality in both periods by ‘earned 
income’ – wages and salaries, plus self-employment. Benefits tended to reduce 
income inequality in the late 1980s, as is to be expected in a period ending with 
the 1989-91 recession. They made only a small positive contribution to 
increased inequality in the 1991-96 period. The share of benefits in overall 
income fell in this later period, because of the economic recovery, and also 
because of the benefit cuts for some beneficiary categories in 1991. These 
tended to increase inequality, but by only slightly more than the decrease caused 
by benefits becoming more concentrated at lower income levels, for example 
because of the abolition of the universal Family Benefit.  
 
Contribution of different income sources to changes in income inequality
Podder and Chatterjee, 1998  -
Income source: 83/84 to 91/92 91/92 to 95/96
Earned income 0.028 0.032
Unearned income 0.015 -0.013
Govt Cash Benefits -0.015 0.004
Total increase in Gini Coeff. 0.029 0.022
Statistics NZ, 1999 Appendix A.4
Income source: 85/86 to 90/91 90/91 to 95/96




NZ Superannuation 0.001 -0.003
Other gross income -0.001 0.002
Direct taxes 0.028 -0.017
Total increase in Gini Coeff. 0.054 0.015  84 
55.    Direct taxes, in the Statistics NZ analysis, made a large contribution to the 
increase in disposable income inequality in the late 1980s. The reasons are quite 
complex. They trace certainly in part to the simplification and reduction in 
personal tax rates made in October 1986 (with the introduction of 10 percent 
GST), and in October 1988. The consequence of those changes was that direct 
tax payments, imputed by applying schedule tax rates to the information on 
household incomes, fell as a share of income by more than a fifth. Because 
personal income taxes are progressive, the fall in their share increased after-tax 
inequality. Offsetting this, however, actual tax payments became more 
unequally distributed, despite the apparent flattening of tax scales, and this 
tended to reduce inequality. One reason for the increased inequality of tax 
payments could have been the increase in income inequality, making higher-
income gainers liable for a larger share of tax than would otherwise have been 
the case. Other possible reasons include the removal, as part of the late-80s tax 
package, of the rebate on contributions to superannuation funds. The Fringe 
Benefits Tax, also introduced in the late 80s, probably led to some fringe 
benefits being converted to cash income, increasing cash income inequality and 
also tax payable more particularly on higher incomes.  
 
56.   Quite significant increases in company taxes also occurred as a result of the 
1980s tax reforms. This report deals with income received by households, which 
includes self-employment income, and company dividends, but does not include 
undistributed company profits. These last would have been reduced by the 
increase in company taxation. This would be expected to flow through to lower 
dividend payments (offset by dividends paid from tax-paid profit being made 
exempt from tax in the hand of shareholders), and to share prices being 
presumably lower than they otherwise would have been. Lower dividends 
would be reflected in household incomes as measured in the analyses in this 
report, but not the effect of lower share prices. 
 
57.   In the latest period, 1990/91 to 1995/96, direct taxes made a contribution to 
reducing income inequality, reversing in fact over half the contributed increase 
in the earlier period. An increase in the share of direct taxation, and a further 
increase in the ‘progressivity’ of tax payments, both contributed to this 
reduction in inequality.  
 
58.   It should be noted that the period covered in the table, up to March 1996, does 
not include subsequent reductions in tax rates, plus changes to the independent 
family tax credit and family support, nor the increase in the ‘top bracket’ tax 
rate this year. 
 
59.   Returning to employment income, and drawing on the information in Statistical 
Appendix table 5, the overall share of both wages and salaries and self-
employment fell between 1985/86 and 1990/91. The inequality of distribution of 
both increased quite markedly, however, particularly that of self-employment 
income, as shown by the “concentration coefficients”, which are similar to Gini 
coefficients, but for specific income sources. The coefficient for wages and 
salaries increased from 0.34 in 1985/86 to 0.39 in 1990/91 (and 0.41 in 
1995/96). That for self-employment income increased from 0.49 to 0.70 (and   85 
remained at that value in 1995/96). It was this increased ‘concentration’ which 
dominated the increase in inequality in the 1985/86 to 1990/91 period. 
 
60.   That self-employment income is widely dispersed across the income range is 
shown in Bururu et al (1998). Both the self-employed and wage and salary 
earners at the time of the 1996 census had their highest concentrations in the 
$30,000-40,000 income range; but the self-employed distribution was much 
flatter, with higher proportions in the top income brackets, but also amongst 




61.   Martin’s (1998a) overall results were given earlier (Table 3). He examined three 
of six posited causes of the overall increase in family census income inequality; 
these being – 
 
-  changing distribution of families by family type 
-  changing distribution of families by labour force participation 
- unemployment 
 
(The other three posited causes were change in earnings inequality, change in 
the composition of family income, and change in the correlation between 
spouses’ labour force participation.) 
 
62.   In brief, Martin disaggregated his families into 1,872 sub-groups, defined by 
age, sex (for sole-parent families), ethnicity, family type and size, and labour 
force status. He found that changes in ‘between-group’ inequality accounted for 
most of the overall change in all family income inequality for the period 1981 to 
1991 (op. cit. page 254); though only about half the overall increase in the 
subsequent period 1991 to 1996. 
 
63.   Restricting his analyses to ‘Employed Families’ – at least one employed parent 
or spouse – the contribution of ‘between-group’ inequality changes became less 
important; less than 40 percent of overall change for the whole period 1981 –96. 
This suggests changes in employment status of families made a definite 
contribution to overall changes in inequality; as indeed is confirmed by Martin’s 
more detailed results.  
 
64.   Martin concludes that the change in income inequality (from 1976 to 1996) has 
essentially been due to shifts in the relative size of categories of families (cross-
categorised by employment status). This effect was powerful in the 1980s, but 
not from 1991 to 1996 with increasing employment. In this last period other 
determinants became more important. (Note that the Statistics NZ analyses 
summarised in Table 2 also found no ‘demographic adjustment’ effect for this 
last period).   86 
 
Section summary: Contributors to changes in Household and Family Inequality 
 
A part of the overall increase in household income inequality can be explained by 
changes in population composition. This amounts to perhaps 10 percent from the 
Hyslop and Maré analyses, and nearly 20 percent in the Statistics NZ analyses, 
concentrated in the 1986 to 1991 period. 
 
A much more detailed categorisation of families by family type, demographic 
characteristics, and labour force status, using census data, found that ‘between-
group’ changes accounted for almost all the increase in the 1980s, and about 
40 percent in the 1990s. It is to be noted that this includes the effect of changes in 
relative sub-group mean incomes as well as changes in relative proportions. That is, 
changes in ‘returns to attributes’ are also included. This, with the more detailed 
categorisation, would help explain the contribution being larger than that found by 
Hyslop and Maré, and Statistics NZ. Also Martin’s census results are for ‘families’, a 
sub-set of the population of households analysed in the other studies, which could 
account for differences in results. 
 
Further contributions from changes in attributes and returns to attributes were found 
by Hyslop and Maré, so that at least a third to around a half of all the increase in 
inequality can be explained by these different factors. 
 
On a different tack, an analysis of different income sources, shows that most of the 
increase in inequality in both the late 1980s and early 1990s sub-periods can be 
attributed to ‘earned income’ changes, with both wages and salaries and self-
employment income significant. The other major contributor to the increase in the 
late 1980s, for after-tax household incomes, was direct taxation. This was because the 
share of pre-tax income taken in direct taxes fell substantially, rather than because of 




C.5   The changes in the economic environment potentially causing the changes 
in income inequality. 
 
65.    This paper has focussed on the changes in the income distribution. It has 
attempted to identify changes in the characteristics of either individuals or 
households, for example level of educational attainment, together with changes 
in the returns to these characteristics. These changes in both characteristics and 
returns are then used to explain some of the observed change in the distribution 
of income. At best these factors help us explain about 60 percent of the increase 
in income inequality; much remains unexplained however. 
 
66.   What underlies the changes in the characteristics of individuals or households? 
What has shaped the returns from education? And what factors might help in 
reducing the substantial part of the change in the distribution of income which is 
still “unexplained?” 
   87 
67.   Over the fifteen-year period covered by this study, there were major changes in 
the economic and institutional environment external to the household. The 
earnings of households from labour and capital, the accumulation of wealth, 
labour force participation and the returns to investment in human capital will all 
be influenced by these broader changes in the economy. Furthermore, these 
same forces can shape the very size and composition of the household itself. 
 
68.   Since the early 1980’s the New Zealand economy has become more open, there 
have been changes in the structure of taxes and benefits, there has been rapid 
technological change in some areas and the nature of employment contracting 
has evolved. Each of these factors can influence the distribution of income 
through a number of channels. In many cases the mechanisms are complex and 
not well understood. 
 
69.   Changes in the dispersion of earnings are clearly an important source of changes 
in the distribution of individual incomes. The external forces outlined above 
may alter the demand for labour, the supply of labour or change the institutional 
setting within which labour contracting takes place.  (Borland, 1999.) 
 
70.   Consider, for example, the greater globalisation of the economy. New Zealand 
is now more integrated into global markets for both goods and services and for 
financial flows. Lower tariffs have been a key element of the opening up of the 
economy. What impact might that have had on the distribution of income? 
 
71.   Access to cheaper foreign goods such as clothing, footwear and automobiles 
confers a gain in real income on households. The impact on the distribution of 
income depends on the particular goods which now face lower tariffs, and the 
consumption patterns of different households. At the same time lower tariffs 
may reduce the costs of importable inputs to farms and businesses, making them 
more internationally competitive and allowing them to expand their output. 
 
72.   Changes in the mix and level of output will change the demand for labour, and 
most probably for different skill levels. Will the new demand be largely for 
higher skilled workers or will the removal of tariffs perhaps eliminate 
impediments to expanding industries, using relatively large amounts of 
unskilled labour? 
 
73.   But the effects of a tariff reduction on income distribution do not stop there. 
Accompanying the removal of tariffs it is possible that the real exchange rate 
will alter, again sending signals to some industries to expand and others to 
contract. Different expansion paths may imply differences in the amount of part 
time employment available and lead to changes in labour force participation 
rates especially amongst women. 
 
74.   In short, this one example shows how a simple change in the external economic 
environment of the household (in this case a reduction of import tariffs), can set 
in train a series of reactions which operate through a wide variety of channels to 
eventually shape the distribution of income. 
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75.   These types of changes will not only influence the current demand for labour, 
but will send signals about the returns to investment in human capital. If 
demand for skilled labour increases, for example, this will encourage higher 
participation rates in tertiary education and training, eventually increasing the 
supply of skills. The initial shortage of skilled labour would be expected to 
increase returns to skills, and income inequality; but in the longer term as more 
persons with the required skills become available, a reversal of this outcome is 
possible.  
 
76.  Changes in the distribution of income have in the past moved in long historical 
cycles. Income inequality increased during at least the earlier stages of the 
industrialisation of the economies of Europe and North America during the 18
th 
and19
th centuries. Growing participation in schooling and tertiary education and 
training then led to greater equality. A similar cycle driven by another wave of 




In summary, the distribution of income is subject to a wide set of forces external to 
the household which influence employment, the demand and supply of particular skills 
and the institutional structure in which employment contracts are formed and 
executed. Teasing out their separate effects on the distribution of income by 
household or individuals will never prove an easy task. 
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Appendix A:  Definitions and technical issues: 
 
Some common acronyms and abbreviations 
 
HES   Household Economic Survey. Statistics NZ. Annual until 1997/98. 
HLFS  Household Labour Force Survey. Statistics NZ 
 
SD or sd.  Standard deviation. Square root of sum of squared deviations from the 
mean. 
CV or cv.  Coefficient of variation.  Ratio of sd to mean. 
 
MLD  Mean Logarithmic Deviation. Mean of deviations of log incomes from the 
logarithm of mean income. 
 
Equivalence scales 
RJS  Revised Jensen Scale, that most used in New Zealand. 
LIS    Luxembourg Income Study scales, particularly the 0.5 scale, which simply 
  divides household income by the square root of the number of persons in  
   the household. 
 
Definitions and Concepts 
 
·  Is income the best concept for measuring ‘inequality’? 
 
There are many aspects to personal and social wellbeing apart from income. 
Physical and mental health is clearly a very important component. But it is 
income that enables us as individuals and family members to obtain the 
necessities of life, and allows us also to seek personal and social fulfilment in a 
multitude of ways. It is possible to achieve some of these things with no, or low, 
income, but it is more difficult. It has been shown that differences in other 
dimensions of wellbeing are often correlated with income differences. In 
particular, those with lower socio-economic status and (in general) lower 
incomes can expect on average more ill-health, and expect also to die younger 
on average. 
 
This does not mean that wellbeing is perfectly correlated with income. We all 
differ in our needs, desires and motivations. Some prefer a simple non-
materialistic life, and are content with relatively low income. Others are not. In 
general, there is a fair degree of correlation between income level and 
wellbeing.  
 
It has been quite often argued that ‘consumption’ or, as another alternative, 
‘wealth’, are better concepts for use in discussing inequality than is ‘income’. 
There are quite good arguments for both. A practical reason for using income, 
however, is the general availability of better information on income.  
 
In practice, the large majority of empirical analyses are in terms of income, and 
this report is restricted to such analyses. (For discussions of the distribution of 
wealth in New Zealand, see for example Easton – 1983 and NZ Planning 
Council 1990, with associated technical papers.)   90 
 
·  Individuals, families, or households? 
 
Income is received by individuals, but the benefits from it are shared within the 
family. (How equally the benefits are in fact shared is another issue. Too little is 
as yet known, despite recent research efforts, for example as reported by 
Fleming, 1997). In terms of reporting on ‘wellbeing’, therefore, and for policy 
formulation, probably the most natural unit is the family. ‘Family’ here can be 
defined to include persons living alone, as well as couples, couples with 
children, and sole parent households. The only household types falling outside 
this definition are then ‘extended family’ households, and ‘non-family’ 
households, for example people flatting together. These two categories make up 
between them around 15 to 17 percent of all private residential households. 
 
There are practical difficulties with the available data-sets, however, in 
excluding these last two household types in a consistent way from the analyses. 
Also there are advantages, for making comparisons between populations at 
different times or in different places, in working consistently with all of the 
population living in private households, rather than with the family sub-set. For 
these reasons, the ‘household’ unit is used in preference to the ‘family’ in the 
studies reported in this paper. 
 
Although the focus of most results discussed in this report is the household, 
income is in the first instance generated by the activity of individuals, and so 
there is necessarily also discussion of the distribution of individuals’ incomes. 
 
 
·  The different income concepts – Market, Gross, and Disposable 
 
Empirical analyses in New Zealand commonly draw on either five-yearly 
Census of Population data, or on survey data from the ongoing Household 
Economic Survey (HES) which covers about 3,000 households, or around 7,500 
individuals, each year. Usually only regular or recurrent cash receipts are 
regarded as income. That is, ‘in kind‘ transactions are excluded, and also gifts, 
bequests, and other transactions of a ‘capital’ nature.  
 
Market Income is that received from market transactions – wages and salaries 
(including regular accident compensation payments), self-employment income, 
investment income, and private superannuation. Wages and salaries have 
accounted typically for 78 to 80 percent of all market income, and self-
employment income for a further 10 to 12 percent. Changes in the distribution 
of earnings can be expected, therefore, to be the dominant influence on market 
income distribution.  
 
Gross (or Total, or pre-tax) Income includes, in addition to Market income, 
transfer income received by the individual or household. This includes social 
welfare income-tested benefits (domestic purposes, unemployment, invalids, 
sickness, etc), NZ Superannuation, and educational bursaries. All these transfers 
are supposed to be measured including tax. 
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Disposable Income is income after tax (and tax credits). 
 
Each of these concepts has its uses. Only Gross Incomes data are available from 
the census. HES provides fine detail on both Market and Gross income, though 
for a sample of the population only. Information on Disposable Income is not 
collected as such. Instead personal income taxes are imputed, in models such as 
Treasury’s TAXMOD, from the data on gross income. 
 
·  Wider income concepts 
 
The income concepts above exclude ‘non-cash’ transactions such as fringe 
benefits, capital gains, and the imputed rental income from owning one’s own 
home. ‘Black economy’ transactions are also omitted, if not reported by 
respondents. For further discussion see the 1990 NZ Planning Council report. 
 
Also excluded are goods and services provided free or subsidised by the 
government. Among the more important of these are education and health 
services. The Statistics NZ report of 1990, using data for 1987/88, is the most 
recent attempt at a full ‘fiscal incidence’ study, following the earlier SEBIRD 
(study of the effect of the government budget on income redistribution) reports.  
 
·  Adjusting for household size and composition. Equivalence scales. 
 
A household’s wellbeing depends not just on its income, but also on the number 
of persons in the household, and to some extent also on the different needs of 
different household members; for instance whether they are children, 
adolescents or adults, and in paid work or not. A household of two adults will 
need a higher income than an adult living alone to have an equivalent standard 
of living. The two-adult household will not, however, need twice the income of 
the adult living alone. This is because there are ‘economies of scale’ in many 
items of household expenditure, such as housing costs, household operation, 
transport, etc. 
 
The standard way of allowing for this is to ‘equivalise’ household incomes. An 
equivalence scale is applied to actual household income to calculate the 
household’s ‘equivalent income’ allowing for household size and composition. 
(A point on the scale is set at unity, commonly for a two-adult household.) The 
larger the household the more the household’s actual income is scaled down. 
 
A number of different scales have been developed. That most commonly used in 
New Zealand is the Revised Jensen scale (RJS). It allows for household size, 
distinguishes between children and adults, and has an adjustment for the age of 
the children, so that adolescents are ‘costed’ more heavily. 
 
The Revised Jensen scale has been criticised, however, as not allowing 
sufficiently for the expenses of some households, particularly sole-person and 
sole-parent households (see for arithmetical illustration Statistics NZ, 1999; 
Appendix A1). 
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Undoubtedly there is a degree of arbitrariness in the choice of equivalence scale, 
and this is one argument against their use. Also the ‘equivalised dollars’ in 
which incomes are measured no longer correspond to actual dollars. On the 
other hand it is clear some account needs to be taken of household size and 
composition in examining the welfare implications of income distribution 
changes.  
 
The two non-Treasury analyses mentioned in this report (Podder and Chatterjee; 
and Statistics NZ) both used equivalised household income data. The Treasury 
analysis, however, (Hyslop and Maré) used actual household income data. As 
an alternative to ‘equivalising’, their work includes a look at changes in the 
income distribution of specific household types.   
 
·  Comparing incomes over time – the appropriate price index. 
 
Normally incomes are compared over time by deflating by the Consumers Price 
Index (CPI) to ‘real’ dollars of some specified date. The assumption is that price 
changes affect equally household spending at all income levels. 
 
In the late 1980s, however, there was a major switch in the tax-base. Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) was introduced at 10 percent on almost all goods and 
services on 1 October 1986, and increased to 12.5 percent on 1 July 1989. 
(There was some offset from the abolition of a number of earlier indirect taxes.) 
Direct tax rates were reduced substantially, and also compensatory increases 
were made to benefits. 
 
This makes it wrong to use the CPI – which includes the GST increases – to 
deflate pre-tax income (Market or Gross) time-series across this 1986 to 1989 
period. Incomes can appear to have fallen dramatically in terms of purchasing 
power, whereas in fact there were compensatory offsets in the form of lower 
direct taxes. The Treasury project, and also others such as Dixon (1998), uses 
therefore the CPI index excluding GST calculated by the Reserve Bank (Roger, 
1995). 
 
On the other hand it is appropriate to use the CPI to deflate Disposable income. 
 
Some of the material from other sources cited in this paper has been 
recalculated using a more appropriate deflator, where it appears an incorrect 
deflator was used. The alteration is indicated in all cases. 
 
·  The choice of time-period 
 
Most of the results reported in this paper are ‘cross-sectional’, showing the 
distribution of income for a given year, and then comparing the distribution for 
that year with other years.  
 
Income distributions can, at least conceptually, be analysed for shorter or longer 
periods. The distribution of weekly or monthly incomes can be of importance, 
for example, in the case of those at the lower end of the income scale who have 
not much scope for averaging incomes over time (Atkinson). In general, weekly   93 
incomes can be expected to be more volatile, and in general therefore more 
unequally distributed than annual incomes. 
 
In the other direction, income might be calculated for periods longer than a year. 
In particular, if concerned with long-term equity, the concept of ‘lifetime 
income’ and its distribution has a lot of appeal. Lifetime incomes would in 
general be expected to be less unequally distributed than current incomes (for 
societies in which most individuals live to a good age).  
 
Data on lifetime incomes are not easily obtained. Ideally a cohort of individuals 
is followed from birth to the grave. That is for individual incomes. It is difficult 
to see, however, how lifetime analyses could be applied to household incomes, 
except in the sense of each individual having attached to them the (equivalised) 
income of the household to which they belong at a given time. 
 
Even if cohorts cannot be followed over a whole lifetime, it can be possible to 
follow them as population groups for shorter periods, for example tracking 
average incomes of individuals aged 30 to 34 in the 1986 census, 35 to 39 in the 
1991 census, and so on. And then comparing their income trajectory with that of 
older or younger groups, where the data are available.  
 
·  Summary measures of income inequality 
 
A wide variety of summary measures have been developed. Some referred to in 
this paper are – 
 
-  the standard deviation of income (or alternatively of the logarithm of 
incomes). Often divided by the mean to give the ‘coefficient of variation’; 
-  the Gini coefficient, perhaps the most commonly used of all measures of 
income inequality. There are a number of ways of defining it. 
Mathematically it is derived from taking the mean of all possible 
differences between any two individuals (or households) in the 
population. It has an easy to understand graphical representation. Because 
the Gini coefficient is so widely used this is illustrated in the chart below, 
using actual 1986 and 1991 data for Household Equivalent Disposable 




-  The x-axis ranks individuals in the population from poorest to 
richest according to the ranking of the household to which they 
belong. The vertical axis plots their cumulated income. The result is 
the Lorenz curve, shown here for both 1986 and 1991, gradually 
curving upwards as richer households are added to the income total. 
If all incomes were equal, the result would be the “line of equality”. 
As they are not, the Lorenz curve sags below the line of equality. 
The extent of the ‘sag’ gives an indication of inequality – and the 
Gini coefficient can be shown to measure this, being the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality, taken as a 
proportion of the triangle below the line of equality. The greater sag 
in 1991 corresponds to an increase in the Gini Coefficient, or 
increase in inequality. 
-  Thus it takes values between zero – for perfect equality - and unity – 
for perfect inequality, increasing as inequality increases. Typical 
values for the distribution of household income are in the range 0.25 
to 0.40; and for individual incomes somewhat higher. 
-  The inter-quartile difference. That is, the 75
th percentile income less the 
25
th percentile income. Division by the median gives the Inter-quartile 
ratio. 
-  Mean Logarithmic Deviation. (MLD). Mean of the deviations of log 
income from the log of mean income. 
- Percentile  ratios (or decile ratios). For example, if the population is ranked 
in percentile order from the 1
st to the 100
th percentile, measures often used 






th, and so 
on. As a measure applied to survey data it is vulnerable to increased 
sampling error at the bottom and top ends of the income distribution. 
Chart A.1   Illustration of Lorenz Curves, and Derivation of Gini Coefficient.
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These summary measures are generally for the whole distribution, though 
percentile ratios are an exception. Different measures will not always show the 
same trends. The Gini coefficient for example is more sensitive to changes in 
the mid-range of the income distribution, whereas others are more sensitive to 
changes at either extreme. In general, however, the different measures will give 
the same inequality ranking to different income distributions, provided the 
Lorenz curves do not cross (Atkinson, 1983). Also the measures given here 
should be thought of as measures of ‘statistical inequality’, and not as 
measuring welfare rankings for different income distributions. It is perfectly 
possible for incomes to become more unequal - as measured say by the Gini 
coefficient – at the same time as the relative position of the poorest improves. 
Or vice versa. If one is particularly concerned with the position of the poor, say 
those in the bottom decile (the bottom 10 percent, when ranked from poorest to 
richest), it is necessary to use statistical measures focussed specifically on them.  
 
Also the measures listed here are only a sub-set, and a relatively small and 
unsophisticated sub-set at that, of the full range of different measures used. For 
further discussion see Sen (1973), Atkinson (1983), Creedy (1997), and many 
others. 
 
·  Statistical significance 
 
Most incomes analyses are based on sample survey data. Changes over time, or 
differences between population sub-groups can therefore be a result of random 
sampling error. Researchers have found it difficult at times to be certain whether 
or not a given change or difference is sufficiently large to be genuinely 
statistically significant, particularly as there are no standard formulae for the 
standard errors of measures such as the Gini coefficient.  
 
Dixon (1998), however, used ‘bootstrap’ methods to estimate 95% confidence 
intervals, for measures related to individuals’ earnings in HES, and found these 
typically should be set at around 6-8 percent either side of the measure being 
estimated. So any change to be demonstrably statistically significant has to be in 
excess of this range. Statistics NZ (1999, Appendix A2) used replicated sub-
sampling techniques to estimate 95% confidence intervals for the Gini 
coefficient of household incomes in HES, and came up with a percentage value 
of seven percent, in good agreement with Dixon. In other words a change or 
difference will in general need to be of this order or larger before one can have 
much confidence that it is statistically significant. The precise amount will 
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Charts and Tables from ‘quincentile’ distributions provided by Stats NZ 
Note that all values are converted to March quarter 1996 dollars. 
Note also that for the ‘household’ analyses in Charts 3 to 9, and Tables 2 and 3, 
each individual is assigned the income of the household to which they belong. 
The charts, and calculations of means, medians, and Gini coefficients, are then 
in terms of these ‘individually assigned’ household incomes. This approach 
appears to be becoming the international standard. Chart 6 earlier in this report, 
however, calculates means and medians in terms of households rather than 
household incomes assigned to individuals. 
 
 
Charts 1 to 2 of changes in distribution of Individuals’ incomes (smoothed) – 
 
-  Male market incomes 
-  Female market incomes 
 
Charts 3 to 8 of changes in distribution of Households’ incomes (smoothed) – 
-  Actual Market Income   
-  Equivalent Market Income 
-  Actual Gross Income 
-  Equivalent Gross Income 
-  Actual Disposable Income 
-  Equivalent disposable Income 
 
Table 1.  Mean and Median Individual Market Incomes – 1981/82 to 1995/96 
 
Table 2.    Mean and Median Household Incomes – 1981/82 to 1995/96 
  Market, Gross, and Disposable 
 
Table 3.  Household Gini Coefficients 
Chart 9.  Household Gini Coefficients 
 
Transition Matrices from Dean Hyslop’s work 
 
Table 4A:  One-year Market income transition matrices – male and female 
Table 4D:  Four-year Market income transition matrices – male and female 
 
Additional detail from Statistics NZ report on Income Distribution. 
 
Table 5.   Share and Concentration Coefficients, and contributions to increase in 















Appendix Chart 1: 



























































Appendix Chart 2: 

































































Appendix Chart 3:  Actual Household Market Income. 





































































Appendix Chart 4:  Equivalent Household Market Income. 
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Appendix Chart 5:  Household Gross Income. 







































































Appendix Chart 6:  Equivalent Gross Household Income. 









































































Appendix Chart 7:   Household Disposable Income. 








































































Appendix Chart 8:   Equivalent Household Disposable Income. 








































































1996  102 
 
Notes: Average and median incomes are given in the following tables to the nearest 
dollar. This is for convenience. It should not be taken to imply that they are accurate 
to that level. In fact 95% confidence intervals will be of the order of several hundred 
dollars either side of the given estimates. 
 
Means and medians are given in terms of March quarter 1996 dollars. The CPI was 
used to convert Disposable Income measures to this basis. For Market Income and 
Gross Income, the price index used was a Reserve Bank index, excluding GST and 




Mean and Median Individual Market Incomes
1981/82 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Males
Mean 26,133 25,254 26,742 27,897
Median 24,747 23,714 23,277 22,069
Ratio 1.06 1.06 1.15 1.26
Females
Mean 9,285 10,123 11,528 12,580
Median 3,651 5,400 4,680 5,489
Ratio 2.54 1.87 2.46 2.29




Means and Medians - Household Income
Mean Household Incomes
1981/82 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Market income:
Actual 43,300 41,780 44,533 46,175
Equivalent 31,681 31,488 34,319 35,841
Gross income:
Actual 47,797 46,778 51,321 51,651
Equivalent 35,459 35,811 40,372 40,715
Disposable income:
Actual 40,422 38,076 39,305 39,641
Equivalent 30,017 29,047 30,884 31,196
Median Household Incomes
1981/82 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Market income:
Actual 40,007 37,487 39,040 38,791
Equivalent 28,798 27,987 29,901 29,581
Gross income:
Actual 42,822 40,830 42,999 41,868
Equivalent 31,348 30,971 33,843 32,725
Disposable income:
Actual 37,562 34,397 33,500 32,785
Equivalent 27,197 26,282 26,349 25,399
Ratio Mean/Median
1981/82 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Market income:
Actual 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.19
Equivalent 1.10 1.13 1.15 1.21
Gross income:
Actual 1.12 1.15 1.19 1.23
Equivalent 1.13 1.16 1.19 1.24
Disposable income:
Actual 1.08 1.11 1.17 1.21
Equivalent 1.10 1.11 1.17 1.23


















Gini Coefficients: Household Incomes - All Persons
1981/82 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96
Market income:
Actual 0.390 0.400 0.474 0.481
Equivalent 0.386 0.396 0.470 0.479
Gross income:
Actual 0.325 0.320 0.368 0.384
Equivalent 0.306 0.303 0.346 0.369
Disposable income:
Actual 0.283 0.278 0.334 0.341
Equivalent 0.259 0.253 0.307 0.322
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Table 4A:  One-Year Market Income Transition Probabilities, 1994-98 
 
 
   
 
First-Year    Second-Year State   
State  Missing  Negative  Zero    Positive Market Income Quintile   Sample 
 Data  Income  Income  1  2  3  4  5  Fraction 




  Missing Data  0.603 0.001 0.061 0.202 0.070 0.026 0.020 0.016  0.113 
 
  Income<0 0.012  0.445 0.190 0.215 0.081 0.032 0.020 0.004  0.005 
 
  Income=0 0.052  0.011  0.667 0.193 0.051 0.014 0.007 0.005  0.097 
 
  1
st Quintile 0.098  0.008  0.120  0.482 0.192 0.062 0.027 0.012  0.156 
 
 2
nd Quintile  0.038 0.002 0.031 0.160 0.488 0.196 0.058 0.028  0.158 
 
 3
rd Quintile  0.018 0.001 0.011 0.054 0.159 0.539 0.173 0.045  0.158 
 
 4
th Quintile  0.013 0.001 0.008 0.027 0.054 0.139 0.596 0.163  0.157 
 
 Top Quintile 0.016 0.001 0.007 0.021 0.031 0.043 0.133 0.748 0.156 
 





  Missing Data  0.591 0.002 0.086 0.171 0.077 0.036 0.023 0.015  0.121 
 
  Income<0 0.020  0.368 0.251 0.216 0.082 0.041 0.016 0.008  0.006 
 
  Income=0 0.039  0.011  0.708 0.154 0.055 0.021 0.008 0.003  0.151 
 
  1
st Quintile 0.091  0.006  0.160  0.442 0.203 0.062 0.025 0.012  0.146 
 
 2
nd Quintile  0.046 0.004 0.057 0.150 0.443 0.216 0.060 0.024  0.145 
 
 3
rd Quintile  0.029 0.001 0.025 0.056 0.161 0.489 0.195 0.047  0.145 
 
 4
th Quintile  0.021 0.001 0.010 0.024 0.052 0.144 0.572 0.177  0.144 
 
 Top Quintile 0.016  0.0004 0.007 0.015 0.029 0.048 0.135 0.749 0.143 
 
Sample Fraction  0.107 0.006 0.156 0.145 0.147 0.146 0.147 0.147 
   
 
Notes: Entries are relative frequencies of being in the Second-year state, conditional 
on being in the First-year state, averaged over the 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 
1997-98 transitions.  Income quintiles are age-specific quintiles, based on all positive 
sample incomes.  Sample sizes = 23,197 males; 22,887 females.   106 
Table 4D:  Four-Year Market Income Transition Probabilities, 1994-98 
   
 
First-Year    Fifth-Year State   
State  Missing  Negative  Zero   Positive Market Income Quintile   Sample 
 Data  Income  Income  1  2  3  4  5  Fraction 




  Missing Data  0.288 0.003 0.105 0.267 0.130 0.074 0.065 0.068  0.145 
 
  Income<0 0.082  0.180 0.197 0.221 0.115 0.098 0.066 0.041  0.005 
 
  Income=0 0.084  0.015  0.469 0.211 0.112 0.056 0.032 0.021  0.098 
 
  1
st Quintile 0.094  0.010  0.166  0.306 0.200 0.115 0.069 0.041  0.148 
 
 2
nd Quintile  0.083 0.005 0.066 0.157 0.292 0.217 0.111 0.070  0.150 
 
 3
rd Quintile  0.053 0.002 0.038 0.087 0.179 0.343 0.207 0.091  0.150 
 
 4
th Quintile  0.049 0.002 0.032 0.062 0.094 0.164 0.386 0.211  0.152 
 
 Top Quintile 0.060 0.002 0.022 0.053 0.056 0.076 0.172 0.559 0.151 
 





  Missing Data  0.251 0.006 0.148 0.199 0.146 0.102 0.073 0.073  0.157 
 
  Income<0 0.058  0.133 0.292 0.225 0.092 0.117 0.058 0.025  0.005 
 
  Income=0 0.059  0.013  0.518 0.163 0.118 0.070 0.039 0.021  0.147 
 
  1
st Quintile 0.090  0.008  0.218  0.251 0.197 0.121 0.071 0.044  0.142 
 
 2
nd Quintile  0.069 0.007 0.109 0.145 0.240 0.219 0.134 0.076  0.137 
 
 3
rd Quintile  0.081 0.003 0.079 0.086 0.160 0.261 0.230 0.101  0.139 
 
 4
th Quintile  0.072 0.002 0.047 0.056 0.086 0.150 0.341 0.246  0.137 
 
 Top Quintile  0.069 0.001 0.029 0.043 0.073 0.091 0.157 0.538 0.137 
 
Sample Fraction  0.101 0.006 0.168 0.137 0.146 0.143 0.146 0.153 
   
 
Notes: Entries are relative frequencies of being in the Fourth-year state, conditional 
on being in the First-year state, over the 1994-98 transitions.  Income quintiles are 
age-specific quintiles, based on all positive sample incomes.  Sample sizes = 23,197 
males; 22,887 females. 
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Table 5.    Share and Concentration Coefficients, and contributions to increase in 
inequality of Household Equivalent Disposable Income. 
 





Figure A4.2    (Note: this figure does not appear in the Statistics NZ publication)
















Share coefficients 1981/82 0.990 0.158 0.059 0.061 0.085 -0.373 0.019 0.000
1985/86 0.953 0.148 0.089 0.069 0.093 -0.378 0.021 0.004
1990/91 0.880 0.123 0.073 0.085 0.103 -0.291 0.021 0.005
1995/96 0.909 0.147 0.062 0.071 0.081 -0.305 0.030 0.004
Concentration coefficients 1981/82 0.333 0.516 0.495 -0.245 -0.154 0.429 0.370 0.000
1985/86 0.335 0.489 0.556 -0.292 -0.172 0.436 0.576 0.144
1990/91 0.388 0.702 0.630 -0.303 -0.143 0.473 0.533 0.013
1995/96 0.409 0.703 0.510 -0.348 -0.215 0.508 0.446 -0.171
Contribution to changes in Gini Coefficient
a) Share effect 81/82 to 85/86 -0.012 -0.005 0.016 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000
85/86 to 90/91 -0.026 -0.015 -0.010 -0.005 -0.002 0.040 0.000 0.000
90/91 to 95/96 0.012 0.017 -0.006 0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.005 0.000
b) Concentration effect 81/82 to 85/86 0.002 -0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.000
85/86 to 90/91 0.049 0.029 0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001
90/91 to 95/96 0.018 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 -0.002 -0.001
Combined 81/82 to 85/86 -0.010 -0.009 0.021 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.005 0.001
85/86 to 90/91 0.023 0.014 -0.004 -0.006 0.001 0.028 -0.001 0.000
90/91 to 95/96 0.030 0.017 -0.014 0.001 -0.003 -0.017 0.002 -0.001
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